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This paper reconstructs the experiences of the International Development Research Centre 
(IDRC) in supporting research on oil crops, focusing on identification and engagement of 
stakeholders.  This paper is based on an extensive review of oil crop-related projects funded by 
IDRC, and key informant interviews with former project staff who worked on IDRC-funded oil 
crops projects in Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia.  The review is complemented with an overview 
of related research approaches that support stakeholder participation in research work. 
 
IDRC supported oil crops research in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia for a number of years 
between 1970 and the late 1990s.  This support evolved through a number of stages, from the 
development of research capacities among institutions via training and technical support, to 
support to biological research in breeding and agronomy, and later to support for network 
activities. In the late 1980s, IDRC assistance to oil crops research shifted from support to 
breeding and agronomy and networking activities to more encompassing production-to- 
consumption activities.  At that time, attempts were made to include more stakeholders in the 
decision-making process. These attempts were meant to ensure that research benefits had a wider 
outreach. 
 
The review and comparison of the IDRC supported research work with that of more recent 
stakeholder analysis tools has shown that IDRC support to oil crops research contributed greatly 
to the Centre’s current greater attention to stakeholder analysis and participation in research 
conceptualisation, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. The Production to 
Consumption Systems Approach (PCSA), which was an integral part of IDRC’s involvement in 
oil crop research work in Kenya, led to wider debates on how research should respond to its 
potential beneficiaries and how best to include them in the formulation and implementation of 
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1 IDRC and Oil Crops Research 
 
The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) began its support of oil crops research 
in the early 1970s, by including Canadian breeders who were then working to diminish the erucic 
acid content in rapeseed oil.  Branching out from its initial mandate to employ Canadian research 
capacity to further development, IDRC embarked on an oilseeds improvement project in Rwanda 
in 1976, which focused on yield improvement and developing disease-resistant sunflower and 
rapeseed. The main stimulus, however, came after the Canadian breeders obtained the “double 
low” erucic acid rapeseed varieties, which were later marketed under the name “Canola.” Later 
IDRC ventures in support of research on oil crops dated from the early 1980s in Asia, especially 
in China and India, and in Africa. Most projects supported by IDRC were implemented by 
national research centres or units and sanctioned by their respective governments. The main 
stakeholders and the research decision-makers in these projects were the researchers and their 
institutions in conjunction with IDRC staff. At a higher level were IDRC and the respective 
governments whose main interests were the results but also total project costs and cost-sharing in 
implementation. The success of the oil crops research work in Canada was shared and reinforced 
as part of the IDRC support to oil crops research in China, another major world consumer of 
rapeseed.   
 
The first phase of the Chinese rapeseed research (1983-87) was coordinated by the Chinese 
Ministry of Agriculture and included the Shanghai Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the 
Qinghai Academy of Agricultural and Forestry Sciences. Results, which included Canadian 
materials adapted to drought conditions and new varieties obtained by the research team, were 
first exposed to wider scientific scrutiny at the first Sino-Canadian Symposium held in 1984 in 
Shanghai. The second phase (1988-92), included additional utilization of Canadian varieties as 
breeder parents and the introduction of appropriate methods of chemical analysis required to 
improve breeding techniques and test the quality of oil and meal derived from rapeseed.  
 
The principal stakeholders in these efforts were the Governments of China and Canada, 
represented through the researchers from the Ministry of Agriculture partnered with other 
participating Chinese research institutes, and IDRC staff, respectively.  The ministry 
representatives and IDRC staff made most of the decisions on what to research.  The research 
team, including Canadian support, implemented the research decisions. 
 
Drawing from its experience in China and to cover Africa, in 1981 IDRC supported the first 
phase of the Oil Crops Research Network (ORN) that ran until 1984. 
 
The goal of the Network was to develop stronger oilseed research in national programs by 
• Linking oilseeds program researchers in India and elsewhere in South Asia with those in 
Africa; 
• Exchanging germplasm between the continents to their mutual advantage; 
• Providing relevant information to national oil-crop improvement programs; and 
• Developing relevant training. 
 
An adviser was hired and based at the Holetta Research Station of the Institute of Agricultural 
Research (IAR) in Ethiopia. His role was to manage the basic operations of the Network: 
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establish a strong base within Ethiopia’s national program; regularly visit countries in the region 
to provide support, suggestions, and encouragement to national scientists in developing stronger 
oilseed research programs; facilitate mutual visits of scientists, organize workshops, relevant 
training courses, and information exchanges, and facilitate germplasm exchanges needed in 
developing improved varieties of oilseeds. Most of ORN’s coordination responsibilities were left 
to the IDRC Program Officer (PO) based in Ottawa. The ORN served IDRC-supported research 
teams in Asia and Africa, promoting mutual communication and collaboration to refine research 
agendas and support their implementation through visits of the adviser, coordinated technical 
support visits of Canadian experts, and the formation/consultation of the oil crops documentation 
centre in Ethiopia.
 
The Network’s operations were strongly influenced by issues perceived to be important to IDRC, 
such as giving greater attention to Africa. It brought together biological researchers from Africa, 
Asia, and Canada.  Its activities centered on germplasm collection and exchange, scientific 
workshops, the publication and distribution of a newsletter, and consultancy visits. The 
constituency of the Network was the biological scientists engaged in Network-related projects 
and their associates, that is, plant breeders, agronomists, pathologists, and entomologists.  There 
was no explicit attempt to include other disciplines or stakeholders in Network activities or 
deliberations.  ORN’s main concern was the generation of production technologies with 
experimentally proven potential to address yield improvement, disease and pest resistance, 
adaptability to different agro-ecological zones (AEZs) through knowledge generation on local 
adaptability of lines brought from other countries, and breeding and agronomy trials.  The 
researchers themselves determined most of the research priorities, either within their individual 
national programs or during Network meetings.  IDRC staff and the Network coordinator were 
also important players in determining research priorities.  The researchers’ efforts under the 
Network appeared restricted mainly to the development of new varieties, without explicit 
attention to their wider impacts on development. Perhaps the only opportunity for consultation 
beyond the researchers themselves started with the establishment of variety trials on farmers’ 
fields to observe and measure yields under farm conditions. Even then however, the main 
research concern was to get an appreciation of the on-farm yields and also of the adaptability of 
the varieties to different AEZs. The on-farm research design did not have a mechanism for 
measuring impact on intended beneficiaries and initially did not solicit any inputs from the 
farmers or other stakeholders, except for permission to use farmland for trials. These trails were 
an early and instinctive approach to the stakeholders, mainly to understand their production 
reality and little to enquire about their decision-making interests. 
 
The Oil Crops Research Network allowed national programs and their scientists to organize 
collaborative research efforts designed to assist member countries solve common technical 
production problems in a more resource-efficient way.  Participating national research programs, 
IDRC, the Network coordinator, and the researchers were considered the main stakeholders, 
while farmers were designated as target beneficiaries, passive stakeholders, seldom explicitly 
consulted. At the time, the active stakeholders were largely those who financed and conducted 
the research work, and their respective institutions.  Farmers were perceived as represented by 
the extension arm of a country’s ministry of agriculture. The term “research-extension linkage” 
gained popularity at this time.  The researchers believed their work too advanced for farmers to 
comprehend, and therefore any farmers’ concerns were expected to be channelled to the 
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researchers by extension personnel who had direct contact with farmers.  However, these 
extension workers had no role in the design of the research. If they were consulted at all about 
the problems farmers faced, it appeared to be cursory and infrequent.  
 
During phase I of ORN (1981-1984), IDRC support focused on the following crops: Brassicas, 
sesame, sunflower, safflower, niger seed, linseed, castor, and groundnuts. However, because the 
International Centre for Research in Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) was supporting groundnuts 
research, IDRC’s interest in this crop diminished. In later years of the Network, it was 
recommended that the number of oilseeds crops that IDRC was sponsoring be reduced to avoid 
duplicating the work of other donors.  Many of these decisions were made during Network 
workshops through consultations between the researchers and the Network coordinator. IDRC’s 
limited funding constrained independent actions by Network members and to some extent, 
prevented more effective networking between countries (TDA 1992). 
 
Some of the key achievements of phase I included visits by the Network adviser to all oil crop 
projects in the region to review research with participating scientists, Canadian scientists 
consulting on visits to Egyptian and Ethiopian projects, and organizing the first oilseed workshop.  
 
Other Network achievements included: 
• Establishment of an oilseeds library at Holetta 
• Support to a highland oilseeds research project in Ethiopia and development of the 
lowland oilseeds research project 
• A series of germplasm collection expeditions and increasing the number of local oilseeds 
collections. 
 
During phase II (1984-87), the ORN carried out similar activities in a more structured form, with 
an emphasis on servicing an existing network. The main achievements of phase II were: 
• Enhancing the capacity of the program staff to conduct oilseeds research through training 
• Providing technical advice and encouragement by the program adviser 
• Publishing and distributing three annual newsletters 
• Coordinating visits for national program scientists from India to other countries  
• The Network consultant advised on research in several countries 
• Cooperation between Agriculture Canada and the Network allowed for rapid progress on 
oilseeds anther culture, with Indian and Ethiopia technicians working in Canada. 
 
On the whole, the general effects of phase II interventions were to increase the capacity and 
transfer of technical know-how from Canada and India to less advanced countries in oilseeds 
research work.  The Network newsletter also expanded outreach to a wider circle of scientists 
and stakeholders interested in the oilseeds sector. 
 
The coordination of Network activities shifted from the IDRC Program Officer (PO) in Ottawa 
to the Network Adviser based in the Holetta Research Station in Ethiopia, and a Network 
consultant (as opposed to the adviser) advised on research in several countries.  The Network had 
an adviser since its inception in 1981, but the original incumbent left in 1984. During this period, 
grants were also made to Somalia for germplasm collection and for a national oilseeds workshop 
in Kenya. Two workshops were held. 
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During the third oil crops workshops held in Ethiopia in 1986, some changes were discussed to 
improve the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the Network.  These included: 
• Developing a separate Brassica subnetwork; 
• Establishing a Network Steering Committee; 
• Improving mechanisms for germplasm exchange; and 
• Increasing collaborative research activities. 
 
Network workshops were used as the main decision-making forums for participating programs. 
The establishment of the Steering Committee and Network subcommittees were finally 
established during phase III of the Network, to provide assistance to the Network Coordinator in 
management and decision-making.  However, funding constraints reduced the extent to which 
this was possible (Thomas 1992).  Establishing the Steering Committee was an important 
milestone in extending decision-making beyond the coordinator to a broad committee.  
 
Phase III of the ORN (1987-89), emphasized information exchange, technical training (mainly in 
breeding and pathology), and the establishment of subnetworks.  Training focused on oilseed 
technician and it was usually crop specific. Some of the specific training events included: 
• Research techniques for sesame and safflower, India 1987; 
• Brassica breeding and agronomy, India 1989; 
• Brassica quality training, China 1990; and 
• Brassica protection training, India 1990. 
 
Phase III intended to strengthen earlier network activities by establishing effective, practical 
liaisons between national oilseeds programs in Eastern Africa and South Asia.  
 
Four subnetworks were created—Brassica, sunflower, sesame, and “other oil crops.” The 
subnetworks were expected to improve research efficiency by grouping researchers working on 
particular crops together.  Researchers working in similar crops sought the opportunity to work 
more closely together without the distraction of other issues and crops, which held little or no 
interest for them. The researchers also felt that this could lead to enhanced focus and more 
resources for each commodity, and a more efficient use of resources.  For instance, the Brassica 
subnetwork had joint programs between two or more countries, focusing on white rust 
(Scerotinia), blackleg (Altanaria), aphid (Orobanche), drought, and quality.  These subnetworks 
enabled scientists specializing in the various crops to interact more closely and economically in 
subnetwork workshops, rather than in the larger Network meetings, and to organize successful 
collaborative research programs.   
 
The evolution of the subnetworks within the oilseed network was in response to the specific 
concerns of scientists working on different commodities.  For instance, when the researchers met 
in IDRC-supported workshops, they would push for the oilseeds of their particular concerns, for 
example, sunflower pests or diseases. The subnetworks diminished existing tensions by putting 
together scientists working on similar crops.   Researchers in the subnetworks operated at the 
national level but were linked at the regional level to share experiences, results, and germplasm.  
In some of the subnetworks and countries, attempts were made to create national networks of 
scientists working on specific crops.  For example, in Kenya, members of the sesame subnetwork 
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collaborated in producing a sesame production handbook for the country. Although these efforts 
did not result in an expansion in the type of stakeholders working together, they did link those 
with specific crop interests and work. Since the networks were developed as IDRC-supported 
forums, linkages with other agencies remained weak. In retrospect, IDRC should have put more 
effort in engaging other agencies as stakeholders in defining the evolution of the networks and as 
potential cofunders of activities.  However, partnership in research was not common or promoted 
during those days.  
  
The difficulties experienced in the larger network were mainly due to the fact that different crops 
manifested different research problems associated with their production.  Therefore, bringing 
together researchers with divergent interests, which was initially seen as an efficient way of 
knowledge-sharing and resource use, produced tension and competition for funds. Researchers 
were not trained for or interested in complex problems or interactions.  
 
Another source of tension was the attention and funding given to those scientists working higher 
profile crops such as rapeseeds and sunflowers, and thus “stealing the show” from scientists 
working on “lower profile” crops.  The Asian scientific contingent was more vocal and 
numerous and pushed hard for resources for oil crops that were relevant to the Asian continent.  
African researchers were not happy. 
 
During the fourth network conference, which took place at Egerton University in January 1988, 
ORN researchers had an opportunity to listen to a presentation by the Vegetable Oils/Protein 
Systems (Kenya) project (VOPS K) research team, which aroused considerable interest. This 
marked the first time that Network members as a group discussed issues outside breeding, 
agronomy, pathology, or entomology!  However, the Network specifically indicated that it would 
support national programs to incorporate socioeconomic variables and total systems approaches 
strictly upon request. In retrospect, one can conclude that there was interest, but also reluctance 
within the ORN to move beyond production technologies in focus crops and adopt a broader 
approach to research.  
 
Finally, consultant Neil Thomas’s evaluation of the ORN phase III (March 1992), recommended 
that the Network should motivate and enable research teams to incorporate relevant 
socioeconomic variables, concepts and tools, as well as a total systems perspective into planning 
and evaluating oil crops research.  This recommendation grew from the inability of Network 
operators to identify linkages between strong National Oil Crops Research Programmes 
(NORPs) and benefits at the farm-level or beyond. By refocusing the networks, potential 
linkages with farmers would become clearer and more effective.  This recommendation was also 
influenced by the emerging research experiences of VOPS (K) that had generated far-reaching 
interest across a wide cross section of other stakeholders in the oil crops subsector and beyond 
ORN’s existing constituency.  
 
Some notable achievements of phase III include: 
• Use of Asian resources in training activities; 
• Strengthening national programs through training (four training sessions were held during 
phase III) and workshops; 
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• Germplasm exchange between member countries (419 accessions were multiplied and 
distributed since the Network’s inception); 
• A readership of 600 recipients worldwide for the Network newsletter; and 
• Formation of a Network committee and subcommittees. 
 
 
Prior to 1992, IDRC funded oil crops research under its Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Sciences 
(AFNS) division.  The division had a budget of $25 million (Canadian dollars throughout, unless 
otherwise specified) and a staff of 27.  The division consisted of six programs: crop production 
systems, animal production systems, fisheries, forestry, post-production systems, and agricultural 
economics. Due to budget constraints, IDRC modified and reduced its organizational structure. 
Following the reorganization, oil crops projects were funded from the Environment and Natural 
Resources (ENR) Division, which was a merger between the older AFNS and Earth and 
Engineering Sciences divisions, and the Environmental Policy Programs of the older Social 
Sciences division.  The new ENR division had a much smaller budget—only $4 million to 
support agricultural and NRM research. The decision to implement a new, broader 
interdisciplinary strategy (TDA 1992), and the lower budgetary allocations meant IDRC could 
no longer support purely agricultural production research.  IDRC made a conscious decision to 
shift its focus and approach and allocate resources to strengthen national programs, while at the 




Even though the Oil Crops Research Network originated as a network of biological researchers, 
efforts were made over time to broaden its outreach and themes. This move was intended to 
increase research efficiency and to accommodate strong researcher stakeholders. The decision to 
establish commodity subnetworks was to enable a wider base of scientists with interest in a 
particular commodity the opportunity to interact more closely. It was also a way to focus on 
lower profile commodities which some scientists, especially those from India, felt were not 
getting sufficient attention. As the ORN evolved, it undertook more work in Asia and less in 
Eastern and Southern Africa, contrary to what was initially intended.  The research groups and 
their strengths drove the process. 
 
The evolution of broadening the Network’s scope was relevant from a stakeholder  and analytical 
perspective, as  it contributed to effective decision-making in the networks. The networks were 
important indicators of the need to identify, understand, and include stakeholders in commodity 
research. Initially, the networks were mostly composed of a single category of stakeholder 
working from a self-centred perspective/interest. In time, that perspective evolved and other 
stakeholders, especially famers, and funding agencies were approached. 
 
The workshop held in Njoro, Kenya (January 1988) introduced new dimensions in research 
design and implementation in the sector for the consideration of the ORN constituency.  The 
workshop suggested that there was a need to look at the subsector beyond production and to 
consult both horizontally and vertically. IDRC recommended that researchers approach 
organizations such as ICRISAT, the Food and Agriculture Organizaation (FAO), and the 
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International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT), as potential partners but this 
was not pursued with vigour.   
 
2 Evolution of the Production to Consumption Systems Approach (PCSA) 
2.1 The VOPS (K) experience 
By mid-1987, IDRC, particularly the Agricultural Economics Program (AEP) of the AFNS 
division, raised the question of whether, in light of strong international supplies and low prices of 
edible vegetable oils, it remained relevant for the Centre to continue its strong support to 
production-oriented oil crop research. Low international prices and substantial global surpluses 
highlighted possible new avenues of support. Would it be better to invest in research on alternate 
and more profitable crops for farmers?  Related concerns within the AFNS division included 
whether oil crops research was generating farmer-relevant technologies in sufficient amounts, 
and whether such technologies were, in fact, being used by farmers. This marked a turning point 
within IDRC. It was concluded that researchers must be further challenged with questions 
regarding the implications and impacts of their results. Was low productivity the main constraint 
to greater and more economical oil crops production? Were oil crop farmers the only audience 
and was increasing their production potential the only relevant target for research in the sector?
  
To examine these issues further in the context of oil crops, a consultant (Dr Carlos Zulberti) was 
hired to study the Kenyan Vegetable Oil/Protein System.  His work was to  identify both internal 
and external constraints to increasing Kenya’s production of oilseeds (Economic Feasibility of 
Oilseed Production, DAP 87-5510, November 1987-January 1988). The study’s findings were 
presented at the Fourth Oilseeds Research Network Conference held at Egerton University, 
Njoro, 25-29 January 1988. The study showed that the factors affecting growth in the Kenyan 
Vegetable Oil/Protein System were complex and involved many actors, not only farmers. This 
was a crucial moment, as IDRC began to consciously encourage researchers to focus on 
identifying relevant stakeholders and to consult them in relation to research subjects, issues, and 
intent.  
 
The presentation and discussion of the Kenyan Vegetable Oil/Protein System (VOPS), sparked 
interest among many Kenyan researchers to fill the knowledge gaps identified within the sector. 
Egerton University took the lead and with encouragement from IDRC prepared a proposal for 
two follow up workshops.  The proposal was funded (DAP 87-4792 at a cost of $35,600) and the 
first workshop held on 16 February 1988. That workshop attracted more Kenyan researchers who 
supported the consultant’s suggestion for more in-depth studies of the VOPS. Participating 
researchers then organized themselves into multidisciplinary groups and began plans to carry out 
the desired studies. At the second workshop on 15 March 1988, researchers presented their group 
plans and consolidated them into a single plan with a budget.  This plan was funded as the first 
phase of VOPS (K) in May 1988 (DAP 88-0027-01) at a cost of $234,100. This phase was 
essentially a six-month rapid assessment of the VOPS and aimed to identify research and policy 
interventions that would improve sector performance. The project ran from May to December 
1988. Results were presented in October 1988 and published as a series of working papers that 
were used extensively.   
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Phase II of VOPS (K)  (DAP 88-0253) was funded in February 1989 through May 1989 at a cost 
of $223,100. Phase II goals included enhancing the institutional base and coordination capacity 
of the project coordination office located at Egerton University, to further its role of monitoring 
the sector and improving subsector performance. Associate researchers were recruited between 
March and April 1989, while efforts to engage key stakeholders and lobby government ministries 
and the private sector continued. A third phase was designed as a two-tier approach. The two 
tiers consisted of the Coordinating Unit work and a series of “satellite” projects addressing 
specific sector interventions to complement the work of VOPS (K) as suggested by the results of 
phase II. The satellite projects were implemented by three different institutions but were 
administered through the Coordinating Unit at Egerton University to ensure consistency in the 
sectoral strategy and approach.  This was new within IDRC because up to this point, all other 
projects were independently funded and monitored by a Centre Projects Officer, without an 
intermediary local institution. This working structure was an early attempt by IDRC to create a 
greater sense of ownership in local research institutions, in preparation for greater “devolution” 
later. 
 
The third phase of VOPS (K) (DAP 89 00 5801) was funded from June 1989 to July 1993 with a 
budget of $936,276, contributed by several programs in IDRC. Again, this marked a new 
arrangement within IDRC, as previous program funding did not feature collaboration across 
units of the Centre.  This innovation meant that there were more “stakeholders,” even within the 
Centre. From July 1989 onwards, VOPS (K) used various forums, including field demonstrations, 
trade exhibitions, and national agricultural shows to raise awareness on the potential role of 
oilcrops in poverty alleviation and to secure greater commitments from policy makers to address 
the policy constraints previously identified in the sector. 
 
The first satellite project (Oilseed Processing DAP 89-0231) under VOPS (K) was approved in 
June 1990 and was implemented by the Agricultural Engineering Department at Egerton 
University. At the same time, various IDRC headquarters staff showed great interest in the 
evolving efforts within VOPS (K) and took a proactive role in securing limited funding from the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the 
Association des Produits à Marché (APROMA), the International Soybean Program (Intsoy), 
CIMMYT, and the Eastern and Southern Africa Management Institute (ESAMI), and in some 
cases, to persuade agencies to consider cofunding  VOPS(K) activities from November 1989 
until the end of the project. Other satellite projects that were funded during the third phase 
included the Sesame Improvement Project (DAP 90-0071) in January 1990 at the University of 
Nairobi and the Industrial Organization Project (DAP 89-0201) at Jomo Kenyatta University of 
Agriculture and Technology in May 1990. At the same time, IDRC delegated the responsibility 
of administering the satellite projects to the Coordination Unit at Egerton University.  At the 
level of research definition, management and implementation, the VOPS(K) was an early multi 
stakeholder effort in the experience of the Centre. 
 
The final component of the third phase of the VOPS (K) was to appoint an Advisory Committee 
that would shepherd the sector’s research and development agenda. This proved to be more 
problematic than initially envisaged, as nominated individuals withdrew from the committee 
selection process. Eventually, in February 1992, VOPS (K) convened an Advisory Committee 
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comprising representatives from various stakeholder groups to guide the development of the 
project. Unfortunately, this effort came too late in the life of the project to have much impact. 
 
2.1.1 Lessons learned  
 
Improving the overall performance of a commodity sector requires extensive collaboration  
among  stakeholders and other actors  
 
For collaboration to occur between the stakeholder groups and institutions that constitute a 
commodity sector, it is crucial that they become aware of each other and of their mutual 
interdependence to obtain benefits and improve the system’s overall performance. IDRC’s 
experience shows that stakeholder’s awareness of mutual interdependence and advantages of 
collaboration are not spontaneous in agricultural commodity systems.  In most cases, their 
interaction is more competitive in nature. Thus, the Production to Consumption Systems 
Approach (PCSA) requires identifying a “champion” and a “championship group” to lead the 
process, facilitate communication and collaboration. and maintain the dynamic.  Ideally, the 
champion must have a excellent understanding of the subsector.  The neutrality of the champion 
is of paramount importance to the PCSA. For the first two phases of VOPS (K), Egerton 
University played the role of champion. However, due to a number of factors, its status as 
champion gradually eroded toward the end of phase III.  
 
Stakeholders’ position, behaviour, and influence are determined by the political and economic 
environment 
 
The political and economic environment plays a significant role in determining the interest and 
involvement of stakeholders in a commodity wide coordinating effort. The push for economic 
liberalization, starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s as part of the structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs), peaked at the end of the Cold War and about the time of phase I of VOPS (K). 
From then on, pressure mounted on the Kenyan government to liberalize the country’s political 
space and the different economic sectors as well. Through the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund spearheaded this drive for economic liberalization regionally. Within the Kenyan 
government, most of the influential technical staff and political appointees had grown up within 
a highly regulated economic environment and vigorously resisted any move toward liberalization. 
On the political front, the ruling class had become significantly repressive because they 
recognized that maintaining a controlled economy was critical to sustain power. At that point, 
there was little distinction between the advocates for political liberalization or those heralding 
economic liberalization. 
 
It was within this charged economic and political environment that VOPS (K) was implemented. 
Conservative stakeholders in the Vegetable Oil/Protein System had more influence compared to 
those who favoured change. They included highly influential parastatals such as the National 
Cereals and Produce Board, Kenya Seed Company, the Central Bank, and their supporters within 
government, especially in the ministries of Finance, Industry, and   Agriculture, and the Office of 
the President. Liberal stakeholders (those who encouraged, supported, or took a neutral position) 
were mostly found in the private sector, donor agencies, and among academics. Liberals in the 
government were less influential and expressed their views with caution.   
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Fresh information provided by the project on the Vegetable Oil/Protein System was welcomed 
by both conservative and liberal stakeholders as each group measured how this new information 
could strengthen their position.  
The creation of an Advisory Committee by the VOPS (K) team toward the end of the third phase 
opened up new opportunities for the conservatives to manage change on their own terms. Their 
influence and control of this committee went to unusual lengths, even so far as to insist that the 
Project Coordinator and Principal Investigator wear acceptable ruling party symbols.  
 
The involvement of different stakeholders in VOPS (K) evolved throughout the project.  During 
the first phase diagnostic stages (May-December 1988), academics and mid-level government 
technical officials were primarily involved. In the second phase (February-May 1989), senior 
government officials and industry leaders became more involved as they recognized the value of 
the information generated from the diagnostic studies. VOPS (K) took up the challenge to 
produce quality information with IDRC encouragement.  This reflected the considerable effort 
that had gone into making stakeholders aware of the research, its findings, and value.  During the 
third and final phase of VOPS (K) (June 1989-July 1993), the Coordination Unit engaged in 
significant interaction with industry leaders, policy makers, and other researchers. Much time 
and effort was spent facilitating collaboration between the institutions involved in data collection, 
processing, and dissemination in order to improve the quality and reliability of the data.   
 
As IDRC demanded tangible results, project staff spent considerable effort identifying and 
engaging key decision-makers, particularly in government, to share the information generated 
under phases I and II and to lobbying for its incorporation in policy documents. To underscore 
the progress made by VOPS (K), government ministries often asked the VOPS (K) team for 
comments on drafts of policy papers on the subsector. This was groundbreaking, as previous 
Kenyan government policy documents were usually prepared based on government objectives 
and industry representations, without any direct input from researchers. For instance, in 
November 1988, the Principle Investigator was invited by the Ministry of Industry to join the 
National Inter-ministerial Committee on Oil Crops, while the project consultant was hired by the 
World Bank to assist the Ministry of Agriculture design a national oil crops project. This was 
another milestone as IDRC realized the catalytic role that the VOPS (K) approach was having on 
other players in Kenya. Subsequently, the IDRC EARO began discussions on linking the VOPS 
(K) experience and approach with the Oilseeds Network with its own programming. During a 
November 1988 visit to Nairobi by IDRC’s Associate Director of Agricultural Economics, the 
Centre agreed to fund a second transition third phase of the project. In its successful linkages 
with the appropriate government officials responsible for specific areas of public policy and by 
providing unique expertise that helped decision-makers accomplish their goals, Egerton 
University emerged as a critical and influential driving force in shaping public policy in the oil 
crops sector.  
 
Government needs the participation of other stakeholders in policy formulation and 
dialoguing 
 
VOPS (K) made significant contributions in the policy development of Kenya’s vegetable oil 
subsector. First, the project spearheaded subsector policy analysis outside of government. 
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Secondly, VOPS created many opportunities for participation by decision-makers and it 
regularly advocated for liberalization of the oil crops subsector. Its analysis of subsector data was 
a valued tool in providing decision-makers with the information needed to follow new policy 
directions. However, IDRC judged these efforts as futile exercises that diverted resources and 
attention of the Coordination Unit away from policy analysis and delivery o project targeted 
outputs. In retrospect, it appears that these efforts were critical to raising the profile of the sector 
and in pushing the government to take specific policy decisions. From August 1990 onwards, 
VOPS (K) was consulted by the Ministry of Industry in drafting cabinet memoranda that 
preceded policy announcements. In October 1990, the government awarded the project enhanced 
access to customs and exercise data on oil crops. In October 1992, the government finally 
liberalized the ex-factory, wholesale, and retail prices of edible oils. 
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3 Local NARS Require Significant Capacity for Research Management 
 
One of the aims of IDRC during the phase III was to transfer management responsibility for 
VOPS (K) and the satellite projects to Egerton University.  Egerton’s performance during the 
first two phases had confirmed its institutional commitment and capacity to fulfil such a role. 
Unfortunately, subsequent staffing and management issues eroded the university’s ability to 
effectively administer the project. Beginning in August 1991, Egerton experienced major 
changes in management, with key departures from the Coordinating Unit. Subsequently, the 
commitment to the satellite projects suffered, and pace of project implementation slowed 
significantly as new managers arrived. Inconsistent staffing, confusion over responsibilities, and 
drawn out and uncertain financial arrangements contributed to a diminished capacity during 
phase III. Funding institutions and projects through a local institution was relatively new to 
IDRC, and its lack of experience, coupled with Egerton’s difficulties affected output from both 
the Coordination Unit and the satellite projects. According to Thomas (1993), the lack of 
transparent financial mechanisms and other weaknesses in Egerton University became a major 
obstacle that delayed implementation and frustrated researchers.   
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4 Advancing PCSR Methodology: A Long-term Institutional Commitment  
 
Lack of capacity, staffing changes, and limited institutional commitment at Egerton University 
resulted in little progress in applying the Production to Consumption Systems Research (PSCR) 
methodology during phase III of VOPS (K). Nevertheless, VOPS (K) pilot tested the Method for 
Assessing Programming and Managing Integrated Production/ Consumption Systems (MEPS) 
within the Kenyan context, with the training of two researchers at UNIDO headquarters in 
Vienna on the methodology. Later, however, one of the researchers left the project limiting 
further development. Using existing literature, MEPS was finally tested within the animal feeds 
industry but this effort was not repeated in the Vegetable Oil/Protein System as serious 
organizational problems emerged that resulted in the eventual  dismantling of  the entire 
coordination team.  Testing this methodology fell short of its objectives due to a weak 
information base and lack of local capacity. 
 
4.1.1 The Advisory Committee and private sector stakeholder motivation 
 
Finally, VOPS (K) set up an Advisory Committee to improve planning and ultimately guide 
growth in the sector, with representation from key stakeholders—government, private sector, and 
research institutions. The idea of the Advisory Committee was initially mooted during the results 
reporting workshops of the VOPS(K) diagnostic surveys and was enthusiastically embraced by 
some of the leading firms for various reasons.  
 
Before 1985, the leading edible oil processing firm in Kenya was a transnational company. In 
1985, the firm incorporated a subsidiary company to promote oilseed production with 
shareholding from the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), and East African Industries (EAI) with an initial capital investment 
of US $50 million. Initially, the subsidiary was successful in promoting rapeseed as a rotation 
crop in wheat-producing areas, and sunflower in maize-producing areas.  However, the company 
soon realized that it was unlikely to recoup its investment in the venture if it could not convince 
the government to provide more support or protect local producers against competition from 
Malaysian palm oil.  
 
When VOPS (K) was launched, the sector’s leading processors were at a crossroads. They 
embraced the Advisory Committee as an alternative route to engage government in discussions 
on the impacts of existing policies of the time, using the platform provided by Egerton 
University.  
 
Within that same period, the largest cereal milling company in Kenya also had oil crops sector 
related interests, ranging from a corn oil extraction subsidiary to a feed milling enterprise. These 
businesses faced stiff competition from small hammer mill operators who were grinding whole 
grain at prices that attracted lower income consumers. As a result, the corn oil processing plant 
was running below capacity and therefore decided to invest in a sesame processing plant located 
on the coast, targeting the lucrative salad oils market. Enthusiasm was dampened, however, 
when it was realized the plant had only enough sesame to run for a month and would then have 
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to resort to coconut and palm oil blends to operate. This would result in a shift in both strategy 
and markets.  
 
The firm regarded participation in the Advisory Committee as a means to win government 
support for local industry, as well as possibly increasing the viability of their investment, all 
under the umbrella of a neutral, public body. Finally, a representative from one of the small 
oilseed crushing firms that had been operational since 1943 was co-opted onto the Advisory 
Committee. During the diagnostic studies, it was discovered that this firm had been managed by 
the same family for more than 40 years. The director was willing to share this experience with 
others in the sector. Getting this firm on board as a member of the Advisory Committee was a 
great accomplishment, as it was recognized by its industry peers as a leader in the sector with 
extensive knowledge of the policy environment. Efforts were made to include other small firms 
in the Advisory Committee but all declined to join. The reason given by the majority of the 
smaller firms who declined was that they felt the presence of the larger processors on the 
committee limited any meaningful dialogue, because in their view, their larger competitors 
colluded with government in determining policy. This suspicion lingered throughout VOPS (K).  
 
These cases illustrate the challenges in activating a stakeholder group that would work for 
collective sectoral improvements, while also responding to the specific interests of participating 
stakeholders. This is the difficult and exhaustive challenge of the champion.  
 
The VOPS (K) Advisory Committee was probably the first effort in Kenya to build a transparent 
stakeholder representation on sectoral issues, including policy. However, the absence of the 
Ministry of Finance on the Advisory Committee seriously undervalued its contributions and 
credibility with the private sector. Without the participation of this ministry, the private sector 
realized the limited influence any VOPS(K) committee recommendations had on government 
actions or policies. The Ministry of Agriculture’s decision later to initiate a parallel Inter 
ministerial Oil Crops Advisory Council, essentially ignoring earlier efforts, further diminished 
the value of VOPS (K) for the private sector.  Of greater concern was the Rural Services Design 
Project, funded by the World Bank with a budget of US $2 million and implemented by the 
Ministry of Agriculture. This venture replicated the work done by VOPS (K) at a lower cost. 
Despite being a member of the Advisory Committee, the Ministry of Agriculture did not build on 
the VOPS’ accomplishments. This scenario makes clearer the need to thoroughly investigate 
who really wins and who loses in sectoral interventions such as VOPS(K) aimed at improving 
overall sectoral performance.  Such overall improvements must be also of interest to the 
stakeholders in the driving seat to be accomplished. While it is difficult to directly attribute 
sectoral change to VOPS initiatives, it can be argued that VOPS (K) did influence both the Inter-
ministerial Advisory Council and the World Bank efforts. 
 
VOPS (K) was used to pilot the PCSA application within the vegetable oil system in Kenya with 
the intention of applying that experience to other countries and other commodity systems. 
Toward the end of the project, VOPS (K) trained participants from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, 
and Zambia on the Production to Consumption Systems (PCS) approach and its application in 
commodity research. The course was highly regarded, but participants felt that the approach was 
not fully defined, materials too dense, and that more fieldwork would significantly improve their 





The VOPS (K) project pioneered the concept of involving stakeholders as an integral part at all 
stages of addressing the constraints in a commodity system. It also demonstrated the importance 
of maintaining a total commodity systems approach to research and development. However, this 
holistic view does not necessarily affect the variables on which important sectoral decisions are 
based. The PCS approach as envisaged and applied in VOPS (K) could have enriched its impact 
if more resources (both human and financial) had been devoted toward lobbying and 
understanding the motivations of key decision-makers. This could have played a role in the 
decision-making process which led Kenya into assuming a World Bank loan which ultimately 
did not alleviate problems in the sector. Awareness raising and advocacy are the necessary 
companions of this type of research for development, and their inclusion in the research process 
requires further review of existing research protocols and concepts that would label them as 
interfering with a “scientific” approach. Several lessons emerged from this experience. First, 
identifying stakeholders and their interests requires time and commitment. Whereas some 
stakeholders are easy to identify and incorporate in the process, others are more difficult to target. 
Secondly, it is not always practical to involve all stakeholders but the absence of key sectoral  
stakeholders can affect overall credibility.  Critical stakeholders can be discovered and recruited 
by surveying other stakeholders on the one hand, and lobbying key decision-makers in both the 
private and public sectors on the other. Third, stakeholder engagement can be a lengthy and at 
times frustrating process that requires long-term individual and institutional commitment. Finally, 
the selection of the championship group is of paramount importance to the process and must be 
done with care to reduce the potential for conflict. In the case of Egerton University, rapid 
management changes in the institution coupled with undue interference from  the political 
regime seriously undermined any efforts to sustain a neutral position on the vegetable oil sector. 
The research team was disbanded before the approach could be more fully refined and 
stakeholder interests fully developed.  
4.2 ORCESA 
 
In October 1991, a team from IDRC and AGREF1 visited Zambia to look at national needs and 
issues in developing plans for a revised oil crops network (Riley 1991). The team met with the 
national oil crops research coordinator, several private processors, the Technology Development 
Unit of the University of Zambia, the Director of Agriculture of the  Preferential Trade Area 
(PTA), representatives of donor-funded projects, Africare, and the Ministry of Agriculture (Riley 
et al. 1991).    
 
A similar visit to Tanzania led to consultations  with the Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre 
(TFNC), Ministry of Agriculture, representatives of the Institute of Production Innovation at the  
University of Dar es Salaam, representatives of SIDO (Small Industry Development 
Organization), and oil seed processors ( Riley 1991).   
 
                                                 
1 AGREF is the Agricultural Research Foundation, a  regional agriculture research organization founded and 
registered in Kenya. 
 19
Zambia and Tanzania were members of the Oil Crops Research Network (ORN).  Some of the 
oilseeds breeders from Tanzania and Zambia were already familiar with the work being done by 
VOPS (K) in Kenya.  Whereas ORN had concentrated on breeding and germplasm exchange, 
VOPS (K) had brought into play a socioeconomic dimension on research into oil crops and at the 
same time widened the net of stakeholders involved in the research process, at least at the 
consulting stage.  ORN was in its final stages of phase II, while VOPS (K) was implementing 
phase III.  Through VOPS (K)’s work, the need for greater stakeholder involvement and 
understanding of the oilseeds commodity sector had been underscored. IDRC started promoting   
a wider understanding and consultation of stakeholders in the research process.   
 
The purpose of the trips to Zambia (Samson Chema) and Tanzania (Ken Riley) were to look at 
national needs and issues in developing plans for a revised Oil Crops Network.  As indicated 
earlier, the two countries were members of the ORN, and IDRC was keen to see whether the 
investment in the two countries had led to expected benefits or if a revised approach was in order.   
During the visits, a wide range of stakeholders and potential stakeholders within the oilcrops and 
vegetable oils subsector were consulted.  The lessons from the VOPS (K) experience played a 
major role in shaping the discussions held during these consultations.  VOPS (K) had completed 
diagnostic studies, established an advisory committee composed of representatives from various 
stakeholders in the edible oil industry, and was implementing pilot projects designed to address 
some of the problems uncovered in its diagnostic studies. VOPS (K) had also recommended 
broad policy and institutional restructuring measures to spur growth of the oil crops subsector in 
Kenya. There was already great public debate about the subsector, and different stakeholders 
were contributing to the policy and development dialogue.   On the other hand, pressure was 
mounting on ORN to reform and embrace greater stakeholder participation and broader research 
agendas going beyond traditional breeding and agronomy. 
 
The meetings in Zambia and Tanzania highlighted the fact that ORN’s 10 years of work had 
neglected a large constituency of the oil crops subsector. 
 
The fact-finding missions in Zambia and Tanzania, established two things—an initial 
understanding of the state of the oil crops subsector in each of the two countries, and contact 
with individuals and institutions interested in the development of the subsector. During the 
consultation meetings, there was obvious interest in starting a dialogue among different 
stakeholders in the industry.  In Zambia, an initial dialogue was already underway along with the 
establishment of the Oilseeds Industry Liaison Service (OILS).  In Tanzania, no association or 
forum for consultation on the oil crops subsector existed. 
 
Respondents in both Tanzania and Zambia were in agreement that knowledge about each 
country’s oilseeds subsector was shallow, and that a more in-depth analysis was required.  They 
indicated that there was limited communication and interaction between different stakeholders in 
the subsector and this contributed to overall poor sectoral coordination and development. Even 
though each of the countries had an oil crops research program, researchers primarily focused on 
the biological aspects of breeding and agronomy, neglecting the bigger picture framing the sector 
and role of stakeholder participation in research results.  Limited consultation between 
researchers and their clients was typical.   Even nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working 
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in the emerging rural oilseeds processing sector had limited interaction with other stakeholders 
beyond those they had targeted. 
 
Liberalization of the agriculture sector was underway as part of the SAP drive by the IMF and 
World Bank. The role of the private sector was becoming more important.  Tanzania was 
decontrolling prices, allowing competition, and moving from a centralized to a more free 
enterprise economy.   
 
Those consulted during the visit by Riley and Chema were of the view that there was a need for 
greater stakeholder involvement and consultation to enhance development of the subsector. 
Stakeholders endorsed the view that an undertaking similar to that done of the VOPS (K) project 
and driven by the industry was necessary.  Based on these findings, IDRC approved the Oil 
Crops Research Capacity for Eastern and Southern Africa project (ORCESA3-P-90-0102, 
$424,194) to respond to the emerging needs of the subsector in Tanzania and Zambia. The 
project was largely meant to transfer and test the PCSR principles evolved from the Kenya 
experience.  The ORCESA project was led by AGREF in close interaction with the ORN and as 
an attempt to integrate the PCS approach within ORN’s program of international collaboration.  
 
ORCESA adopted a participatory approach in which all stakeholders were involved in a 
diagnostic and identification exercise for priority areas for subsector development. 
 
In Zambia, ORCESA found a suitable partner in OILS—the Oilseeds Industry Liaison Service—
which had been formed before the launch of the project.  The genesis behind OILS was the 
frustrations the national oilseeds research coordinator encountered in negotiating the release of 
superior oilseeds varieties and the subsequent poor adoption rates attributed to the lack of a 
reliable seed multiplication and distribution system and an inefficient extension system. At the 
same time, the private sector (processors and farmers) were fighting over oilseeds pricing. 
Processors felt that oilseeds were overpriced since the processed oil had to be sold at 
government-controlled prices.  Farmers were equally convinced that local processors wanted 
their produce for a song. OILS was started by industry actors in order to respond to these 
challenges (Personal communication by the then oilseeds research coordinator and processors 
visited in Zambia, Mbwika/Mburu April 2004).  The group included representatives from 
industry (oilseeds and animal feed processors, and input suppliers), the Ministry of Agriculture, 
NGOs, and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA).2 OILS was later incorporated under Zambian law 
and members agreed to pay a small fee.  There was initial resistance to OILS, however, 
especially among oilseeds crushers, who viewed each other as competitors and could not see the 
benefits of a common forum. With some persuasion and fact sharing, the stakeholders agreed to 
sit together. OILS  was seen largely as a lobby group for the subsector. 
 
When AGREF started implementing the ORCESA project, it relied on OILS as its main link to 
the industry.   Industry sources, however, indicated that even though they embraced the project 
with good intentions, OILS’ original agenda was supplanted in pursuit of ORCESA project 
objectives.  This turn of events was partially blamed for the collapse of OILS following the end 
of ORCESA.  Industry insiders indicated that the ORCESA project came with different priorities 
                                                 
2 A regional trading block based in Lusaka, Zambia, which was trying to initiate an agro-industrial development 
program within its agricultural division. 
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from OILS, but since the project had funding there were no open objections. The coordinator 
indicated that many in the private sector considered the project’s activities purely academic and 
of little relevance. The project was proposing internal collaboration to improve overall 
performance under contextual circumstances, while the initial onus centred on a collective 
lobbying effort to influence changes in specific aspects of sector environment.  Remaining 
disagreement and apparent recrimination seem to point to insufficient interaction and 
communication between project implementation and participating stakeholders, that is, arriving 
at a better understanding of shared conceptual framework and ciscumstances.  
 
To recap, ORCESA’s main objective was to strengthen the capabilities of national research 
systems to identify and solve the critical problems hindering the performance of the vegetable 
oil/protein sector in two countries (Tanzania and Zambia) of Eastern and Southern Africa.  The 
specific objectives were: 
• To identify leaders and establish teams of  researchers in the oilseeds sector of the two 
Eastern and Southern African countries; 
• To train country teams in the PCSR approach and provide an opportunity to design 
technical and policy research agendas to improve the  vegetable oil/protein sector of their 
respective countries; 
• To promote coordination among national PCSR teams in the oilseeds sector and within 
the Oilseeds network; 
• To develop mechanisms to incorporate and expand the use of the PCSR approach as part 
of future activities of the Oil Crops Research Network; and 
• To develop the basis for a modular course on the concepts and utilization of the PCSR 
approach for inclusion in formal long- and short-term training of professionals in Africa. 
 
In implementing the project, AGREF adopted a rather mechanical way of replicating the VOPS 
(K) process. It required the country teams to undertake a literature review of the sector and 
produce an information abstract to form the basis of engaging the subsector in a dialogue to 
identify information gaps. This took time to accomplish and the stakeholders, especially in 
Zambia where the majority were in private business were growing concerned.  Within OILS, 
they felt they had identified sectoral problems and felt little need to embark on further analytical 
work.  When the researchers were brought for the PCSR course at Egerton University, it 
appeared that the private sector stakeholders felt that they were being immersed in academia. 
They were more concerned about solving perceived problems, which required immediate action, 
and less on the perceived more academic pursuits of the project.  
 
After the literature review, a workshop was held to discuss the findings and a decision was taken, 
championed by AGREF and the NGOs, to undertake an in-depth study to fill in information gaps. 
This did not go down well with the private sector again but they never voiced their opposition.  
However, it was evident that most of the stakeholders started seeing the exercise as academic and 
of no immediate benefit.  At the same time, OILS held its annual general meeting.  The resultant 
change in chair, coupled with the coordinator departing on maternity shortly thereafter, created 




Despite the differences in their objectives, OILS was in basic agreement with ORCESA 
proposals in terms of a sector stakeholders group, collaborating to improve overall sector 
performance. 
 
At the start of the ORCESA project, stakeholders in the edible oil industry saw an opportunity to 
influence policy, stabilize prices, and enhance the performance of the sector.  The 
implementation of a VOPS-type analysis was seen as an opportunity to provide a clearer 
understanding of the options, policies, and possible outcomes of improving the operations of the 
components of the subsector.  What concerned the industry was the lack of follow-up on the  
issues that had brought them together in the first place and the lack of a clear understanding of 
where the studies were leading. By the end of the ORCESA project, OILS meetings had become 
erratic and most stakeholders had lost interest in the association. 
 
In Tanzania, the Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre (TFNC) 3  assumed the host 
institution/coordinating role of the project and established a steering committee to manage the 
research process. Unlike Zambia where there was already an infant  oilseeds coordinating body, 
in Tanzania various institutions implemented different aspects of oilseeds development along the 
p-c-s continuum.  TFNC was largely concerned with nutritional aspects of oilseeds and other 
crops.  SIDO and Carmatec focused on the development and testing of rural oilseeds processing 
technologies, while T-Press concentrated on promoting rural processing of oilseeds.  The 
Ministry of Agriculture targeted policy issues and promoting production activities through 
extension services. The Tanzania Agricultural Research Organization (TARO), on the other hand, 
focused on research in breeding and agronomy.  The Ministry of Trade was responsible for trade 
promotion and policy.  Processing industries in the country were largely government controlled, 
with few private concerns.  The public processing companies, which were largely controlled by 
cooperatives, were in the process of being privatized.  All of these institutions/organizations 
operated separately without any formal or informal forum for sharing information. 
 
Tanzania was also heavily dependent on imports of crude and fully refined palm oil from 
Malaysia. This introduced tension into the system, especially among competing edible oil 
companies. The private sector was involved in cutthroat competition, resulting in unfair practices, 
such as importing fully refined oil for packaging but declaring it as crude, so as to attract lower 
tariffs.  Those who operated above board sought ways to address these practices and looked for 
opportunities to elicit government action. This group were immediate supporters of the proposed 
stakeholders’ forum and saw it as an avenue to confront those involved in unfair trade practices.  
  
Given the small size of the private sector in Tanzania’s oilseeds industry, the group did not have 
as many private stakeholders as Zambia.  The committee was dominated by TFNC researchers, 
Ministry of Agriculture personnel, one private processor, and a Ministry of Trade and Industry 
representative. The committee was chaired by a senior official from the Ministry of Agriculture 
with a mandate to: 
• coordinate all VOPS activities; 
• advise on policy issues related to VOPS; and  
• prioritize actions for implementation. 
                                                 
3 A national public institution mandated to undertake research in food and nutrition. 
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The inclusion of various stakeholders in the sector analysis was also meant to achieve 
broadbased consensus on identifying major constraints and priorities for immediate and long-
term interventions, and ownership. 
 
In order to find common ground for negotiations, the project supported a subsector diagnostic 
study that looked at the entire sector from production to utilization. The research teams for 
ORCESA consisted of multidisciplinary researchers from various organizations and institutions 
in each country. This was an effort to create a sense of ownership of the results.  The research 
teams began with a literature review of the subsector. The information gathered formed the basis 
for initial discussions, which identified information gaps and the need for further research. It was 
agreed that an in-depth diagnostic study be carried out to fill in the information gaps identified 
by the literature review. 
 
The literature review was able to demonstrate that the two countries: 
• Were heavily reliant on imported vegetable oils;  
• Had potential for production of raw material for domestic processing of edible oils;  
• Had national per capita intake of edible oils below the world average;  
• Lacked a development policy for the subsector; and  
• Spent large sums of scarce foreign exchange on importing edible oils. 
 
The research teams were led by a national coordinator, who was selected on the basis of his/her 
understanding of the subsector, interest in working in the subsector, and potential ability to 
influence of the stakeholders.  The national coordinator was later referred to as the “champion.”   
The champion worked under the direction of a steering committee, which was later referred to as 
the “championship group” and was composed of people and institutions with interests in the 
subsector.  Its mandate was to provide  policy direction, and lobby the government to implement 
favourable policy changes.  The group was also responsible for hosting national workshops. 
 
The activities of ORCESA attracted the interest of the regional trading block PTA, which at the 
time was developing its own agro-industrial development framework.  Based in Zambia, PTA 
had worked with OILS and agreed to host the secretariat.  This provided PTA an opportunity to 
learn of the PCSR methodology, which it later tried to introduce in other member countries. 
 
In Tanzania a research team made up from the TFNC, Ministries of Agriculture, Trade, and 
Industry, and a private oilseed processing company carried out the VOPS diagnostic studies. 
 
During the ORCESA project, individual meetings with NGOs/projects that were looking at the 
oilseeds subsector in each country continued, so as to learn from each other and plan joint 
strategies.  In Zambia, Africare was the most visible and supportive NGO of the ORCESA 
project and was one of the founding members of OILS.  It was also the single largest promoter of 
rural oilseeds processing in the country.  It was also promoting improved sunflower seed 
multiplication and distribution.  It worked largely with small-scale rural processors and farmers.  
The Zambia National Farmers Union (ZNFU) was also a strong founding member of OILS and 
continued to support its activities.  Both ZNFU and Africare were seen as the main 
representatives of the poor smallholder in the oilseeds sector.  The Ministry of Agriculture also 
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played a role in representing smallholder farmer interests.  In Tanzania, a number of NGOs were 
promoting rural oilseeds processing and represented the interests of the poor farmers and 
consumers, especially those in the rural areas. 
 
In each of the two countries, national oil crops workshops were held, bringing together a cross 
section of stakeholders in the oilseeds industry.  These were billed as the first ever such 
workshops to bring together diverse stakeholders in the industry.  Stakeholders were able to 
review the information presented by the researchers and make recommendations for further 
research and identify areas for policy change and immediate investment.  The workshops formed 
a basis for expanding the stakeholder network and provided a forum for joint deliberations and 
information sharing.  They also reinforced the need for stakeholders consultation in subsector 
development. 
 
The promotion of rural-based oilseed processing technologies, and up-front stakeholder 
participation in both Tanzania and Zambia brought to the fore the need for developing soft- 
shelled and high oil content sunflower seeds.  The focus on soft-shelled products arose because 
hard shells were increasing the wear and tear of the screw expressers and the higher oil content 
increased the returns to oilseed processing.  The project was also able to facilitate the acquisition 
of soft-shelled sunflower material “Record Seed” from Tanzania for multiplication in Zambia.  
One of the NGOs promoting rural processing of oilseeds in Zambia and connected with the 




When AGREF and IDRC staff visited Tanzania and Zambia prior to the ORCESA project, a 
major concern by stakeholders in both countries was the lack of a coherent data/information base 
on the subsector and the lack of, or poor, communication between stakeholders in the industry. 
 
In Zambia, the ORCESA project was able to strengthen the already established OILS committee. 
In Tanzania, where no organized stakeholder group existed, the project was able to establish a 
steering committee with representation from most stakeholders, although farmers were absent 
from the group. 
 
ORCESA used a participatory and consultative approach to build a database on the oil crops 
subsector in the two countries.  The information gathered was debated by stakeholder 
representatives at national workshops. 
 
A number of policy recommendations that were of concern to processors and farmers were also 
raised with the government and recommendations made regarding government action.  
In Zambia, the project introduced a soft-shelled sunflower seed “Record” from Tanzania, which 
was of high oil content.  This was largely of concern to NGOs and projects that were promoting 
rural oilseeds processing.  At the end of the project, Africare established a rural oilseeds 




4.2.2 Lessons learned  
 
One of the principal lessons learned was that researchers must take the time to understand the 
aspirations of stakeholders, their interests and fears, and the trade-offs.  In the case of OILS, 
there was a bit of a rush to fulfil the project objectives without the flexibility to accommodate the 
immediate concerns of OILS stakeholders.  The project team failed to appreciate the fact that the 
group had been formed with one purpose and tried to fit the objectives of ORCESA within the 
concerns of OILS.  The project design and its commitments also affected the flexibility of the 
AGREF research team. 
 
Again, in engaging stakeholders one needs to understand the diversity of the group, not only in 
terms of its interests but also its level of knowledge (general and academic), bargaining power, 
and influence. This is useful in terms of determining the approach so as not to disenfranchise the 
less powerful or less knowledgeable members of the group.  How to incorporate more flexibility 
into these type projects remains as a question. 
 
The length of engagement is also important.  ORCESA, and VOPS (K) as well, never really 
allowed sufficient time to align the thinking of both researchers and stakeholders in terms of how 
they view the sector and their approaches to research design and planning. The two years 
allowed for implementing ORCESA was rather short and left the sector with more questions than 
answers.  While the project easily identified factors constraining the sector, it fell short in 
providing and monitoring solutions.  
 
The other important lesson from ORCESA experience was the fact that a sector needs a 
committed and knowledgeable champion to sustain the process and to keep the collective action 
going. The champion should also command respect from the rest of the stakeholders and be 
neutral. The indisposition of the VOPS (Z) coordinator during implementation of ORCESA was 
a major blow to the project in Zambia.  The situation worsened with the arrival of a less qualified 
OILS chair toward the end of 1993.  
 
In Tanzania, most of the steering committee members were drawn from the public sector or 
NGOs and therefore did not have a strong stake in the subsector.   Again, the steering committee 
was a creation of ORCESA and not much time was spent to nurture  it into a self-sustaining 
group.  Discussions with former steering committee members (Mbwika/Mburu April 2004) 
indicated that the project was rather hurried and that many did not understood the principles of 
the PCSR. Discussions with the TFNC Managing Director, who served as the VOPS (T) 
Coordinator, also indicated that the project raised too many expectations and folded before it 
could achieve all of its objectives.  However, the Centre was pleased with the enthusiasm raised 
within the sector, which resulted in the formation of an oilseeds manufacturers association. The 




In terms of approaches, the ORCESA project closely followed the process used in Kenya by 
VOPS (K), and achieved a similar level of  analysis and stimulation of the sector, but with fewer 
resources and in a shorter time. The familiarity of the core team with the groundbreaking 
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experience in Kenya helped. Most stakeholders were involved from the onset in data collection 
and dialogue on the state and needs of the subsector.  VOPS (K) brought in private stakeholders 
much later after most of the information on the sector had been gathered, analyzed, and 
presented. Experience indicated that there was no need to wait and it was advantageous to 
involve as many stakeholders as early as possible. There was also an attempt in ORCESA to 
bring more stakeholders, such as farmers and NGOs, than had been possible under VOPS (K).  
Elements of implementation of some of the opportunities that required immediate attention were 
also made part of the project, such as the provision of soft-shelled sunflower seed from Tanzania 
to Zambia, where an international NGO and member of OILS, volunteered to fund multiplication 
activities.  In Zambia, a private sector-led organization of stakeholders had been formed prior to 
the ORCESA project, without government support and with limited resources.  Members agreed 
to pay a fee to facilitate the activities of a group coordinator.  This again demonstrated the 
willingness of stakeholders to utilize their own resources for subsector development.    It appears 
that ORCESA, to some extent, influenced the direction of the OILS group because it had the 
resources to pay the coordinator.  However, ORCESA did not give OILS sufficient time to 
nurture its own priorities, and influenced the nature of activities that were to be conducted.  
There was hidden resentment that emerged too late to salvage the group, as most stakeholders, 
mainly private processors, felt activities were too academic. This must be interpreted as an 
unfortunate consequence of the learning process and inadequate attention, at the time, to the 
rationalization and preference of the stakeholders. To OILS, the issues that brought them 
together, namely disputes over prices between processors and farmers and dumping cheap oil on 
the market, were clear cut and did not need require extensive research.  Perhaps ORCESA’s 
approach should have been more flexible to allow the group to define its priorities, which 
ORCESA should have helped implement. These lessons are used today in stakeholder interaction.  
 
The demise of OILS highlighted the need for strong leadership. Because the OILS constitution 
required a rotating chair between different stakeholder groups, there came a time when insiders 
thought the chair was too weak and lost interest in championing the group.  Unfortunately, the 
coordinator of OILS was on a prolonged leave at the same time, compounding the lack of 
leadership.  This led to a lapse of activities and the subsequent disinterest in the group by a 
majority of the members. 
 
One main conclusion is that the research intent and approach, even though it may coincide on the 
whole with that of the stakeholders, may not be aligned and in some cases may conflict with the 
practical approach and immediate strategies of the stakeholders. This has implications for the 
concepts and tools of participatory research or interventions—that is, who participates and who 
leads. Should research support stakeholder groups (such as OILS) or do researchers ask  
stakeholders to participate in the research, which may not necessarily be totally or temporarily 
aligned with the interests/goals of stakeholders.  Sensitivity to these types of considerations are 
much more advanced in modern versions of participatory research and stakeholder analysis tools 
but were  not yet present at the time of the VOPS (K) and ORCESA experiences.  
 
Leadership and articulation of stakeholders’ interests is therefore an important factor in any 





The Vegetable Oils/Protein System Improvement Network (VOPSIN), was the successor to 
ORCESA.  VOPSIN was designed to build upon the results and experiences of the ORN series 
of projects, VOPS(K), and ORCESA (Tanzania and Zambia).  The project was conceived 
following a meeting organized by the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(PTA) 4  in February 1993 to review its agro-industrial development strategy.  During the 
workshop, several countries expressed a willingness to work with COMESA to develop their oil 
crops subsectors.  At the meeting, VOPS (K), VOPS (T), and VOPS (Z) presented papers on 
their experience with the PCSA application on the oil crops subsector. COMESA was at the time 
hosting VOPS (Z) in Zambia and so was already familiar with the methodology.  The majority of 
the countries represented at the meeting were members of the ORN or had their own projects on 
oil crops, but wanted a more encompassing sectoral development focus.  This led to the 
development of the Vegetable Oils/Protein System Improvement Network (VOPSIN) project.  
 
VOPSIN (93-8477, $596,745) was started in 1994 and covered the following countries— 
Uganda, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  The VOPSIN project mandate was to 
extend VOPS (K/T/Z) activities in more countries in the COMESA region.  The project was very 
much an extension of the ORCESA project but covered more countries and now fell under the 
umbrella and promotion of COMESA and its focus on regional integration and trade.  It 
benefited from VOPS (K/T/Z) experiences.  It coincided with a “tide” of agriculture 
liberalization in the region and many countries were looking for solutions to crucial problems 
facing the agriculture sector. Stakeholder consultations were already viewed as important 
avenues for seeking feasible solutions to current problems. In Zimbabwe, where liberalization 
was slowly advancing, the government sought views from stakeholders on how to conduct 
business in a liberalized economy. 
 
In a way these efforts also helped researchers widen their vision and better position their work in 
terms of priorities and venues to further magnify their contribution to development and to 
identify potential partners and agendas in a more effective and efficient manner.  
 
In line with its protocol, COMESA desk officers/contact points in each country were approached 
and asked to identify stakeholders in the oilseeds subsector for initial consultations.  The officers, 
with assistance from ministries of agriculture and trade, also compiled data on national oilseeds 
production, processing, and utilization, which was used as a basis for initial consultations and 
characterization of the sector.  The project endeavoured to search and lobby for the inclusion of 
as many stakeholders as possible in project decision-making from the outset. 
 
Within each target country, an “oil crops steering committee”5 was formed.  The committee was 
responsible for supervising all project activities under VOPSIN in each country.  The committee 
met monthly  to review progress in terms of data collection or implementation of activities.   
                                                 
4 The organization has since evolved into the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
5 These were referred to as task forces and consisted of representatives of stakeholders in the oil crops subsector.  
The PTA desk officers or an officer appointed from the ministries of agriculture acted as  conveners. 
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Although the committees were not legal entities, in some countries, such as Zimbabwe and 
Uganda, they received substantial recognition from high level ranking government officials.  In 
Zimbabwe, the Minister of Agriculture formally recognized the steering committee as the 
ministry’s advisory agent on oil crops policies.  The minister even went ahead and established a 
secretariat at ministry headquarters, where they would meet, deliberate on issues, and forward  
recommendations to  the ministry. 
 
VOPSIN borrowed heavily on oilseeds sector coordination activities from more experienced 
countries like Zimbabwe, Kenya, and South Africa.  In South Africa, the Oilseeds Board, a 
grouping of farmers with large interests in oilseeds farming, was an important ally in the latter 
part of VOPSIN.  VOPSIN drew lessons on how the South African Oilseeds Board had managed 
to mobilize farmers into a commodity development group with considerable policy influence and 
international trade connections.  The Board is self-sustaining and finances research for the 
oilseeds subsector.  It set up a marketing wing and a grades and standards laboratory especially 
for groundnuts and had an elaborate fundraising mechanism for its membership.  However, its 
constituency was far more limited than those recruited under VOPS (K) and ORCESA. 
 
During the implementation of VOPSIN, an attempt was made to define the stakeholders in the oil 
crops subsector.  Two categories of stakeholders6 were defined—key stakeholders and key 
players.  Key stakeholders referred to those individuals or institutions with a direct stake, either 
financially or materially, in the subsector and who could suffer/or gain financially or materially 
depending on sector performance.  These included oilseeds farmers, oilseeds processors, oilseeds 
consumers, etc.  Key players were defined as individuals or organizations whose actions, or lack 
of, could affect the subsector positively or negatively but who were unaffected by sector 
performance These include extensionists, researchers, policy makers, and some NGOs, for 
example,  Appropriate Technology-Uganda (ATU), Africare in Zambia.  
 
During VOPSIN, subsector studies were completed in Uganda, Malawi, and Zimbabwe.  Zambia 
and Tanzania continued strengthening their stakeholder involvement in sector development 
initiatives.  Attempts were made to form stakeholder steering committees in Uganda, Malawi, 
and Zimbabwe. The goal was to facilitate broad stakeholder participation in sector analysis, 
planning, and identification of priorities for action. 
 
4.3.1 Attempts to form an oilseeds council 
 
Uganda came close to establishing an oilseeds council when a national consultant was hired by 
VOPS (U) to seek views on the need, structure, and functions of such a body.  This was largely a 
result of the broad interest expressed in the subsector by a number of organizations, including 
governmental units and private enterprises. At the time, the United State Agency for 
International Development (USAID) was funding the Uganda Oilseeds Processors Association 
                                                 
6 A DFID-funded BGS technical report on Groundwater Protection and Management for Developing Cities defines 
stakeholders involved in groundwater as those individuals and institutions that are concerned with, or have an 
interest in, groundwater resources and their management.  They include groundwater users who have a direct 
interest in groundwater resources, and those involved in groundwater development, management, and planning, 
including public sector agencies and ministries, private sector organizations and firms, NGOs, and external sector 
agencies. 
 29
(UOSPA), a grouping of small-scale oilseeds processors, that was largely concerned with the 
availability of processing material, especially soybeans, and marketing end products. The 
association had substantial support from the Uganda Co-operative Alliance.  Appropriate 
Technology Uganda (ATU) was also promoting small-scale processing, mainly sunflower, in the 
eastern and northern parts of the country. The Uganda National Farmers Association was also 
promoting production and marketing of oilseeds especially, soybeans among its farmers.  The 
major edible oil processors in the country were concerned about the impact of imported oils and 
fats from Kenya.7  At the time, the Government of Uganda was also negotiating with the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) for funding for a major oil palm 
development program.   In Uganda, it was easy to identify stakeholders and bring them together.  
 
The consultant’s report was presented to all stakeholders at a workshop funded under the 
VOPSIN project and a resolution passed to work for the registration of a National Oil Crops 
Development Organization (NODO).  Unfortunately, the organization was never launched due to 
lack of funds and the subsequent end of VOPSIN support. However, the steering committee 
continued promoting policy reforms and allocation of resources to the sector by the government 
and donors. 
 
VOPS (U) was able to influence the government and IFAD to include a traditional oilseeds 
component in the palm oil project.  The Fund was also convinced that a model oilseeds 
development council was essential to faster development of the subsector.  By the end of 
VOPSIN, the IFAD project had indicated it would use the VOPS(U) model of a oilseeds 
development council.  The VOPS (U) coordinator was made the IFAD project coordinator and 
continues in that role to this day.  Through the intervention of the VOPS (U) steering committee, 
US $2.3 million of the IFAD funding was allocated to traditional oilseeds development while US 
$33 million went into the development of the oil palm project. This was and important outcome 
of the VOPSIN. Initially, all funding was marked for the oil palm project.   Stakeholders, 
especially UOSPA,8 were concerned that despite the huge investments by donors to promote 
production and processing of sunflower and soybeans, the government was borrowing money to 
invest in oil crops that had not been a priority. 
 
4.3.2 Lessons learned 
 
It was evident that the knowledge and experiences regarding stakeholders was shared among the 
projects. The nature of stakeholder engagement and approach evolved with experience. There 
was also a call to be opportunistic.  In Uganda, there was an attempt to influence government 
loan discussions with donors for financing oilseeds development.  In Uganda, Zimbabwe, and 
other countries, there was engagement of high level government officials.  For example, senior 
officials in Uganda and Zimbabwe were directly involved in the respective oil crops 
development and stakeholder consultations.  This in itself gave the effort significant publicity 
and profile in government decision-making. Most stakeholders were also persuaded to join the 
                                                 
7 They were convinced that VOPSIN, being a COMESA program, would be an important channel to air  concerns 
about unfair trade practices in edible oils and fats in the region. 
8 A grouping of medium-scale oil seeds processors supported by USAID, whose main agenda was to promote 
sunflower and soybean production and processing. 
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steering committees (championship group) because of its high profile and government 
participation, which they saw as an opportunity to influence government policy. 
 
In Zimbabwe, the Commercial Oilseeds Producers Association (COPA), an umbrella body for 
commercial oilseeds producers, was spearheading farmers’ interests and lobbying for 
government policy support.  Technical support from VOPSIN allowed the formation of an 
informal but more broadly based oilseeds council in Zimbabwe, which was given a secretariat 
and housed at the Ministry of Agriculture.  The council included representatives from farmers 
unions, seed companies, animal feed millers, oilseed millers, government, and NGOs.  It was 
chaired on a rotational basis and mainly deliberated on policy issues, crossborder trade, 
government regulations, and  supply and demand projections for the coming seasons.  The 
motivating factor for belonging, especially for farmers and processors, was their wish to air their 
views on the ongoing agricultural liberalization. Farmers wanted protection from cheap imports 
of soybeans from South America and price guarantees from local processors, while processors 
wanted to lobby for protection from cheap imports of edible oils and protein cakes from South 
Africa.  The processors were also concerned about a South African-imposed levy on imported 
soya cake from Zimbabwe, while at the same time subsidizing imports of soybeans from 
Zimbabwe. 
 
In implementing the VOPSIN project, COMESA was guided by the lessons and experiences 
from the ORN, VOPS (K), and ORCESA.  Based on these lessons and experiences, VOPSIN 
developed the following indicators of success for its activities in each country and at the regional 
level: 
• Knowledge generated on commodity system;  
• Stakeholders and key players actively participate in and guide the process;  
• Both groups deliberate on knowledge gathered and  prioritize constraints limiting 
subsector development;  
• Decisions taken on  specific interventions/solutions;  
• The subsector undertakes to coordinate its own development; and  
• A sustainable stakeholder-led body be established and given resources, and its role 
clearly defined to champion the overall development of the PCS process. 
 
During the implementation of VOPSIN, there was more freedom for each national teams of 
stakeholders to decide on areas of investigation without undue pressure from the project 
implementers from COMESA to follow prescribed project objectives. It was building on lessons 
gained in the ORCESA project. The COMESA project team only provided guidance. In the 
previous projects, there was some pressure from project leaders to adhere somewhat rigidly to 
project objectives.  As a result of VOPSIN’s flexibility, local ownership of the process was more 
pronounced, especially in Zimbabwe and Uganda. 
 
The steering committees set up during VOPSIN were meant to guide national subsector 
diagnosis, provide an opportunity for open dialogue, and act as a channel for regional networking 
and information exchange for stakeholders.   
 
The involvement of COMESA in the project was seen by some stakeholders, especially 
processors in landlocked countries, as a way to address  what they perceived to be unfair trade 
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practices by companies based in the more prosperous and often non-landlocked countries (for 





VOPSIN endowed PCSA with a broader regional dimension and also coalesced experiences 
from earlier interventions in Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia.  COMESA’s involvement pulled in a 
regional dimension to policy issues and concerns among major edible oils processors.  Major 
oilseeds and edible oil processors in the region were attracted to VOPSIN partially because of 
the perceived regional stakes involved as a result of COMESA’s presence. A majority of 
processors requested that COMESA implement fair trade practices, and were keen on monitoring 
VOPSIN to see whether their recommendations were indeed being addressed.  The processors 
saw COMESA as a body with sufficient muscle to influence national and regional trade policies.  
 
During VOPSIN, attempts were made to engage high level government policy makers (such as 
Zimbabwe’s Minister and Permanent Secretary of Agriculture and Uganda’s Presidential Adviser 
on Agriculture).  The involvement of high profile personalities in VOPSIN activities led to the 
program’s increased visibility and attracted a greater degree of interest from a broader spectrum 
of stakeholders.  At the final VOPSIN workshop held in Nairobi, there was a spirited attempt by 
many stakeholders to attend the meeting at their own cost.  A majority viewed this as an avenue 
to influence regional policy on edible oils and fats.  One outcome of the workshop was that 
stakeholders felt that regional market information and policy reforms should be key to any future 
investment in the oilseeds subsector.  
 
By this time, biological researchers were well aware of the ability of other  stakeholder 
constituencies  (processors, farmers, policy makers, and NGOs) to influence development work 
on oil crops. Stakeholders were also becoming more aware of the development benefits of 
greater participation  in commodity development work.  Donors and government had also 
become more sensitized on funding or promoting research work that examined the bigger picture 
of commodity development and the needs of its client base.   This was reinforced by the then 
emerging participatory research methodologies which were urging inclusion of project 
beneficiaries in the design, planning, implementation, and monitoring of activities.  
 
The emerging eminence of nonbiological researchers in oilseeds development work was mainly 
due to two factors: first, the agricultural liberalization policies touted by the IMF and World 
Bank; and second, the fact that for the first time, nonresearchers were being given an opportunity 
through IDRC-supported projects, to have a voice in the conceptualization and implementation 
of oilseeds development work.   
 
The enthusiasm with which farmers and processors participated in the VOPSIN research, 
especially in Zambia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, revealed the lost opportunities of  the past when 
their participation had not been enlisted. The project ended up working with a new constituency 
and leaving behind the limitations of traditional research protocol. In zeroing in on different 
aspects of the development/constituency/process continuum, the project unearthed other potential 
stakeholders. The researchers were now seen as part of a bigger group of stakeholders or actors. 
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Farmers and processors were able to influence policy and offer candid thoughts on solutions to 
challenges in the sector. This was an important milestone within IDRC because it pointed out 
that while biological research is important, it is only one of many variables that determine 
policies and final effects in production and people’s development. Having a better understanding 
of those other variables increases the impact of research. Without shifting from its central core 
constituency of researchers, IDRC was being challenged to take into account the interests of 
other decision-makers in the research it supported, so as to ultimately contribute more 
consciously, visibly, and effectively to development.   
 
4.4 UFFRO Fish Commodity Economic Systems (Uganda) Project 
 
The Fish Commodity Systems Economics (U) Project was started in June 1992. Its main 
objective was to analyze and provide an information base to strengthen the research capacity of 
the Uganda Freshwater Fisheries Research Organization (UFFRO) and thus improve the 
performance of the fisheries subsector. The project design followed that pioneered by VOPS (K).  
Initially, two UFFRO researchers underwent two-weeks of training on PCSR conducted by VOP 
(K) researchers at Egerton University. This course provided the UFFRO researchers a better 
appreciation of the concepts and skills used in the Production to Consumption System Research 
(PCSR) approach, for subsequent adoption and application to the fish commodity sector in 
Uganda. 
 
The training emphasized the need to involve major sector participants in identifying problem 
areas in the commodity system and in designing subsequent steps. The training also highlighted 
the human and material resources required to understand and tap the knowledge, technology, and 
willingness of sector stakeholders.  These were influenced by such factors as culture, the 
environment, competitiveness, and incentives. 
 
The initial diagnostic studies found six major problems facing the fishing industry in Uganda, 
namely: a) fishing areas were often located far from major consumption centres and 
infrastructure was often poor; b) fish traders were not organized and hence were unable to lobby 
government or the private sector to improve working conditions; c) most traders offloaded their 
fish at markets which were scattered and far from fishing sites. As a result, fish traders dealt 
mainly in processed fish; d) most fish trade enterprises did not keep business records and had 
few skills to make consistent estimates of their business requirements; e) most fish traders did 
not have access to credit and their finances relied on the resources available to their owner 
operators;  and; f) the policy environment was characterized by multiple taxes further reducing 
profit margins before sales.  
 
Unlike the broad based advisory committee model that was used in VOPS (K), the UFFRO Fish 
Commodities Economic Systems Project only brought together officials from various 
government departments during workshops rather than entering into long-term relationships. 
This effort resulted more academic than the VOPS series of activities. 
 
The project generated a large volume of data on the fisheries subsector and equipped UFFRO 
with a vehicle, an outboard motor, and office equipment. In retrospect, it was only after political 
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decisions to liberalize the Uganda economy in 1992 that significant progress was made in taking 




The commodity systems approach to research provides a broad spectrum of information for 
decision-makers to pick and choose from. This is especially critical in a rapidly changing 
socioeconomic environment, as was the case in Uganda following the implementation of the 
UFFRO project, when information generated from the project informed donor investment 
decisions.  The most important lesson learned from this experience was that resources are critical 
in encouraging stakeholders to engage in discussions regarding improvements in a commodity 
system requires significant time and resources and that fishers are much more difficult to reach 
and engage in these discussions.   
 
These observations generally fits within the “theory of stakeholder identification and salience” 
proposed by Mitchell et al. (1997) that highlights three stakeholder attributes that merit attention: 
• Stakeholders’ power to influence the sector;  
• The legitimacy of a stakeholders’ relationship to the firm; and  
• The urgency of the stakeholders’ claim on the firm.  
 
On the basis of these attributes, the theory proposes a typology of stakeholders “to whom 
management should pay attention” (Mitchell et al 1997). It follows that stakeholders with two or 
more attributes are likely to be noticed and participate; those without them will tend to be 
ignored. In the context of this paper, we refer to the sector, issue, or problem situation, rather 
than the “firm.” 
 
When local producers lack power and legitimacy in the eyes of public authorities, they may be 
unable to participate or even take advantage of new laws expressly drafted to delegate authority 
to them. Others may have to intervene on their behalf until their capacity improves. Where 
power is concentrated in the hands of an elite, the process of stakeholder identification and 




5 PCSA and Other Production and Commodity System Approaches 
5.1 Farming Systems Research and Extension 
 
Farming Systems Research and Extension (FSRE) approaches a holistic perspective to examine 
links between elements of the system and explain processes and performance. FSRE was 
developed by multidisciplinary teams of biophysical researchers that expanded to include 
agricultural economists within Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR) and other centres, such as CATIE in Latin America, and Los Baños University in Asia, 
in the mid-1970s. It integrates skills in biological and social sciences so that problems are 
perceived in a socially and technologically appropriate sense. It is particularly useful in 
agricultural development by addressing the problem of developing and using new agricultural 
technologies. FSR initially ignored marketing but has evolved to integrate it. FSRE does not 
focus attention on a specific commodity unless the farms of interest happen to be a monoculture 
production system.  A variety of interdisciplinary methodologies, for example, Rapid Appraisal 
Methodologies, have been developed within the FSRE context, which are also useful in PCSA. 
 
FSRE centres on the farmer’s decision-making process but does not consider fully consumption 
and market factors or the policy environments that influence such decisions. It describes 
resources used, crops grown, livestock kept, and quantities produced and consumed.  It also 
requires specifications of farmer aims and objectives. 
 
PCSA offers a glimpse of the connections in a targeted farming system with its environment 
along the market processes and actors associated with a given commodity that also constitute the 
farming system. PCSA is also complementary to FSR in that it permits a look at the entire 
production chain beyond the farmers’ domain and into the people and institutions involved, their 
interests, motivations and concerns. The interests and actions of these external stakeholders 
become important in the farmers’ decision-making process. 
 
5.2 Sector analysis 
 
Sector analysis is based on the theory of industrial organization and offers a rationale for PCSA. 
Sector analysis looks at the different channels through which a commodity flows, from 
production to consumption (vertical links between different players in a commodity).  It 
describes key elements of the sub-sector and identifies key constraints to better performance. 
PCSA calls greater attention to the groups behind the flows and processes of sub-sector 
operations.  Sector analysis can be useful in designing policies and projects to overcome 
identified constraints.  Sub-sector analysis comes closest to embracing PCSA concepts. In 
undertaking the sub-sector diagnoses, PCSA practitioners applied sector analysis principles.  
Application of sector analysis is critical to PCSA practitioners because it helps in understanding 
the different channels and processes through which a commodity flows.  Such understanding is 
critical in understanding the critical constraints facing the commodity system, identifying the 
main players in the commodity system and understanding the policy and technological 
constraints to the commodity development.  Sector analysis can also help PCSA practitioners in 
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understanding the influence of different industry players on the behaviour and conduct of the 
industry. 
 
5.3 Market research 
 
Market research uses a variety of methods of analysis, some of which are theoretical, descriptive, 
or diagnostic to determine the competitiveness and efficiency of a marketing system.  They also 
use sector analysis perspectives and tools.  Market research aims to identify consumer needs, 
market segments, and the purchasing process to minimize uncertainty in making market 
decisions.  Market research is a useful tool in determining supply and demand conditions for a 
commodity and the price levels at a given time, the factors that influence supply and demand, the 
process of price determination, market size, players, and type of market (competitive, monopoly, 
etc). In market research one is also concerned about the influence and interests of the participants 
along the market chain. 
 
Market research results can be used to make investment and policy decisions, and gage the 
competitiveness of the market.  PCSA also employs some of the concepts and tools of market 
research.  A sound understanding of marketing research for a target commodity can help PCS 
practitioners make informed decisions on the nature of the demand of a commodity, which can 
then be used to influence investment or research decisions at the production level.  For example, 
a good understanding of market demand will inform researchers on the type, quality, and 
quantity of commodities “desired” by the market. This can help them in design of research 
programmes that are clearly client driven and enhance the chances of adoption and utilization of 
their research results.  Market research can also help PCSA practitioners to identify the various 
players in the marketing systems, their concerns and influences. 
 
5.4 Commodity chain 
 
Commodity chain analysis is concerned with commodity transformation, aggregation, 
desegregation, and distribution. It is a variant of sector analysis. It can be used to understand how 
the commodity changes along the chain and in this way identify opportunities and constraints 
along the commodity chain. It can be useful in assessing market efficiency, structure, and 
performance.  It can also be useful in understanding necessary investment decisions to make 
marketing more efficient. In studying the commodity chain, one may also make reference to 
individuals and firms involved in commodity transformation and their potential influence on the 
performance or efficiency of commodity transformation.  PCSA practitioners can benefit from 
commodity chain analysis tool, to understand how the commodity moves along the chain. 
 
5.5 Value chain 
 
Value chain analysis looks at the steps of commodity transformation, aggregation, desegregation, 
and distribution. It is a variant of commodity chain analysis but is concerned more with 
understanding the value addition and distribution of benefits among the players along the 
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commodity chain.  Understanding how the commodity changes and gains value along the chain 
can help identify opportunities and constraints along the route and so obtain maximum value.  It 
is another variant of sector analysis. Value chain analysis can be useful for identifying 
investment opportunities in marketing/distribution and processing that can transform commodity 
performance at any point along the chain.  Value chain analysis can also be used to identify 
opportunities for policy-making. Value chain analysis can also be useful in understanding 
inefficiencies and constraints along the commodity chain that would be of use to PCSA 
practitioners.   
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5.6 Stakeholder analysis 
 
Stakeholder analysis is used to identify groups of people that form the relevant constituency of a 
commodity subsector, and to learn about the interests of stakeholders individually or as groups, 
and the effects of such interests. It can be used to assess how different interests and expectations 
unite stakeholders to achieve a common goal. It can also be used to discover patterns of 
stakeholder interaction and therefore provide options for improving the level and outcome of 
those interactions.  Stakeholder analysis can also be used to discover potential areas of conflict 
between stakeholders and thus, hopefully, ways to avoid such conflicts. Stakeholder analysis is 
therefore complementary to and a useful tool for the PCSA. 
Stakeholder analysis can be used as a precursor and in preparation for full participation of 
stakeholders in the life of a project, therefore improving its sustainability.  Stakeholder analysis 
also allows strategic participation and project development decisions on the basis of such 
participation. However, stakeholder analysis has its limits in that it cannot be expected to solve 




6 Best Practices to Improve PSCA Objectives   
 
The PCS approach is a tool to identify sources and types of demand for technologies and policies 
that will improve the performance of an agricultural commodity.  It implies the application of a 
comprehensive system perspective to visualize the structure, behaviour, and performance of the 
Production to Consumption System (PCS) associated with a targeted commodity.  The target 
PCS is constituted by the groups of people, the resources and processes they command, and the 
interactions among themselves and with the environment that affect the production, processing, 
storage, movement, trade, and final utilization of a commodity (Navarro 2002).  In the case of 
agricultural commodities, the focal PCS intersects with one or more farming systems (FS) at its 
on-farm9 production and related stages. This intersection highlights the interdependence and 
complementarity between the PCSA and the Farming Systems Research and Extension (FSRE) 
approach and related on-farm or community-based work.   
 
From the Farming Systems Research, PCS can borrow aspects of understanding better the overall 
farming enterprise and the non-farm activities that influence labour and resource allocation in 
farmer decisions. 
 
In its present state, PCS incorporates many aspects from both the market research and 
commodity chain approaches, as well as from the value chain. However, the PCS tools for 
identifying opportunities for investment and policy interventions can be further enriched by 
borrowing the concepts of aggregating and disaggregating the steps of product transformation as 
applied in the value chain approach. In the case of vertical transformation of a commodity 
system, PCS intersects with more contemporary sector analysis approaches such as value chain 
analysis, commodity chain analysis, and market research analysis. Although a variant of sub-
sector analysis had been done on oil-crops in Zambia before the implementation of the IDRC 
supported VOPS (Z) project, it failed to elicit the public debate that was generated by the VOPS 
(Z) project. This was largely because the study ignored the participation of the many 
stakeholders along the chain.  There was also lack of follow-up in terms of implementation of the 
recommendations made in the sub-sector analysis report, because the implementers failed to 
create ownership of the whole process, and therefore ownership of the outcome was missing.  
PCSA tried to overcome this by including stakeholders in the research decision-making and 
implementation process in all the countries in which it was applied.   
 
From stakeholder analysis, PCS can borrow the more refined concepts and tools for the 
identification of stakeholders on the basis of their attributes, interrelationships, and interests. In 
any commodity system, each group of stakeholders has its own concerns, expectations, and 
priorities that need to be taken into account before intervening in the sector and to intervene in 
meaningful ways that will be supported and hopefully driven by stakeholders. Certainly, each of 
the stakeholders’ interests and derived actions will have a direct or indirect impact on the 
commodity system and therefore on the interests of other stakeholders in the chain, which may 
also lead to conflicts and which, in turn, proper stakeholder analysis can help minimize.   
 
                                                 
9      Or the commune as in the case of communal areas. 
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To a great degree, more refined stakeholder analysis was missing in the oil crop research 
reviewed and its inclusion is necessary to make the PSCA more effective an intervention tool 
and improve performance in a PCS.  A solid appreciation and utilization of stakeholders’ 
analysis should help to identify early potentially competing and complementary interests and 
therefore facilitates their alignment through focused dialogue among the different stakeholders to 
achieve collective goals. For example, in Zambia, when OILS was formed, the Zambian 
researchers were concerned about the long delays in releasing improved oilseeds varieties and 
the poor adoption rates of the released varieties. Farmers were concerned about the low prices 
being offered by local processors, while the processors were concerned that the prices demanded 
by farmers were uneconomical in a country where edible oil prices remained under government 
control.  Certainly, in the case of Zambia, better knowledge and application of stakeholder 
analysis concepts/tools would have helped.  Sector analysis studies need to be complemented 
with stakeholders analysis and participation to achieve ownership and eventual results utilization. 
 
In Kenya where an Advisory Committee was established, a key omission in the makeup of the 
group was the absence of a representative of the Ministry of Finance, which had clout in most of 
the policy areas of concern to the group.  Small-scale farmers were equally unrepresented.  Even 
the private sector representatives did not truly represent their constituency, as there was no 
association to nominate a representative.  VOPS (K) considered private sector representatives as 
those who held some power in the sub-sector.   
 
A better understanding of stakeholder analysis by VOPS (K), AGREF, PTA/COMESA, VOPS 
(Z) and VOPS (T) could have resulted in a more balanced and perhaps more legitimate and 
sustainable lobby groups.  In understanding and applying the principles and tools of stakeholder 
analysis, researchers will know better how to identify and involve relevant stakeholders in their 
research planning, priority setting, implementation, and monitoring.  A thorough understanding 
of different stakeholders is critical for making the right research decisions.  Research in this case 
will not be done as an end in itself but to address focused stakeholder constraints and contribute 
to better performance of the sub-sector (commodity system). 
 
Integrating these concepts from stakeholder analysis into the PCS would help researchers 
reconcile seemingly unrelated issues such as developing low cost production technologies that 
enable farmers to earn profits while offering processors the same commodity at lower prices. 
Such technology would be widely adopted because it addresses real issues that are of concern to 
the two most important stakeholder groups within the commodity system. This approach 
responds to the ideal of win-win solutions. 
 
The experiences of IDRC and its partner institutions in implementing PCSA on oil crops 
suggests that the rules that deal with stakeholder involvement need to be more flexible, resilient, 
and adaptive in defining stakeholders, boundaries, and  problems. One of the main objectives of 
the oil crops supported projects was to establish a championship group to maintain the overall 
PCS comprehensive view and to foster the research and related interventions required to improve 
and sustain sub-sector performance.   
 
The establishment of the groups was, however, done without developing a clear definition of the 
composition of the group and what it would take to keep it working united. The championship 
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group was envisioned as a grouping of representatives of different stakeholders. Because there 
were no organized groups/associations representing stakeholder groups, members of the 
champion group often represented their own, rather than a group interest.  In the case of VOPSIN, 
national team leaders were asked to establish task forces without a clear definition of their 
composition and nature or how to make them work. 
 
In implementing the PCS approach in IDRC-funded projects, implementing agencies identified 
and used linking institutions in each of the target countries.  These institutions became the 
conveners of the oil crops research work.  They were selected on the basis of their considered 
interest or stake in the oil crops sector.  For example, in Kenya, Egerton University was 
designated the convener, as was TFNC in Tanzania, OILS in Zambia, the Ministry of Agriculture 
in Uganda, the Ministry of Agriculture in Zimbabwe, and Chitedze Research Institute in Malawi.  
Overall, only OILS was a  legitimate stakeholders group, but it lacked experience and resources 
and  had no personnel or offices of its own. 
  
In the ORCESA and VOPSIN projects, the implementers looked for neutral (non-partisan) 
institutions to act as conveners.  This was considered important in order to ensure a broad 
consensus among different stakeholders.  The selection of neutral conveners was also based on 
the fact that industry players were more likely to give information to neutral institutions, rather 
than groups they regarded as competitors more likely to leak confidential company information.  
 
These were noble approaches, which could have benefited from a better understanding of 
stakeholder analysis tools.  
 
Based on the findings of this review, the weaknesses in the projects that used PCS were 
attributed to misunderstanding the interests of stakeholders by the implementing agencies on the 
one hand, and mere lip service to stakeholder priorities on the other. Consequently, projects 
ended up addressing issues of secondary concern to the stakeholders, eventually losing their 
interest.  
 
Stakeholder analysis tools provide approaches to stakeholder identification and understanding of 
individual interests and concerns, which could form the basis for strategically establishing a 
commodity sector championship group to help researchers define a relevant research agenda. 
Here PCS can borrow mainly from more recent stakeholder analysis theory that improves 
understanding and identification of stakeholders in a commodity system of a research 
program/project. 
According to Freeman (1984, p. 64), the challenge of stakeholder identification is complicated 
by what he calls the “congruence problem.” “Analyzing stakeholders in terms of an 
organization’s perception of their power and stake is not enough. The congruence problem has to 
do with the assumptions an organization makes about its stakeholders, about how it interacts 
with them, and on what basis it is willing to negotiate with them.  At the outset we indicated that 
many times in a PCS efforts the stakeholders did not even identify with each other and at times 
interacted only in a competitive mode.  Information sharing and awareness creation would help 
them to get to know better their mutual interdependences and align their interests and thus deal 
with this issue of congruency.  
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Stakeholders’ attributes, such as power and legitimacy, help explain the odds of a stakeholder 
becoming a convener or a facilitator, or in PCS terms, a champion. With regard to the time 
element, or urgency, some authors suggest that avoidance of urgency on the side of the facilitator 
or champion is a key component to successful conflict management (Thomas et al. 1996). An 
organization may be able to convene others temporarily; thereafter, however, the stakeholders 
will decide on the role and desired attributes of the convener and on specific functions for other 
neutral parties, such as facilitators, who may become providers of expert information. This was 
observed in Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia where stakeholders had developed alternative 
mechanisms to pursue their common interests after the IDRC-supported project ended. 
This proposition is particularly relevant for all the institutions and projects that assumed they had 
the power and legitimacy to convene stakeholders. Much of the literature on stakeholder analysis 
fails to question this assumption and seems to be directed predominantly at those groups or 
agencies who seek to convene and assume they will control a project (Warner and Jones 1998). 
The result was often the imposition of urgency, as a result of administrative deadlines imposed 
by a distant head office. It is argued here that a convening organization can gain legitimacy by 
openly acknowledging its own limitations as a convener.  For instance, stakeholders in Tanzania 
and Zambia cited this as a major weakness of AGREF.   
The ability to convene a wide range of stakeholders requires a convener with widespread 
recognition and impartiality. In Kenya, Egerton University was the convener and whereas the 
institution had legitimacy, it lacked the power to change the policy environment. Over time, 
some of the stakeholders perceived that it also lacked neutrality.  In Tanzania, the TFNC lacked 
both power and neutrality and therefore most private sector stakeholders perceived it to lack 
legitimacy in spearheading positive changes in the sector. In Zambia, whereas OILS possessed 
both legitimacy and urgency, its credibility was eroded when members felt that their interests 
were no longer a priority for the organization. These three case studies suggest that government 
organizations need a third-party convener with a reputation as a legitimate, neutral, multi-actor 
organization, even though the government organizations may have had the power and urgency to 
convene on their own.   
 
In conclusion, any group or organization seeking to convene other stakeholders should first 




7 Sustainability, Equity, and Efficiency within the PCS Framework 
 
According to Todaro (1986) in the 1970s began a remarkable change in public and private 
perceptions about the ultimate nature of economic activity. In both rich and poor countries there 
was growing disillusionment with the idea that the relentless pursuit of growth (efficiency) was 
the principle economic objective of society. In the developed countries, the major emphasis 
seemed to shift toward more concern for “quality of life” (balanced equity, efficiency, and 
sustainability).  In poor countries, the main concern focused on the question of growth versus 
income distribution (equity). Many poor countries had experienced relatively high growth rates 
but this did not lead to improved standards of living for the poor. Today, development 
encompasses balancing growth, equity, and sustainability in the production and utilization of 
goods and services. The following section briefly addresses the simultaneous incorporation of 
sustainability, equity, and efficiency elements into and improved PCS framework, as required to 
improve the access, utilization, and enjoyment of natural resources by people in the pursuit of 
food, health, employment, and income security.  
 
This Todaro (1986) study explored the pursuit of the goals of equity and sustainability as ways to 
support social well-being and environmental integrity through the development of a truly long-
term social, economic, and ecological infrastructure, one which promotes social justice and 
equality. The challenge to make more popular and visible these concerns about equity and 
sustainability is a complex one. We need to understand the institutional roots and the social 
sources of social inequities and their links with environmental and natural resources management 
and in particular their degradation  
 
Sustainability 
Sustainability is the most important concern in all development programs. The response to the 
sustainability concern implies that every development intervention or decision must be taken in 
awareness of its long-term impact on present and future generations directly or through effects 
on the environment. Ultimately, sustainable development interventions are those that benefit 
society through economic, social, and institutional arrangements that allows society to continue 
to derive benefits even after external support is withdrawn. In addition, sustainable development 
interventions must be commonly replicated or adapted. To achieve this, it is important to ensure 
a buy in by the target communities and to do research in a way that the community and its future 
generations benefit. One has to understand that individual desires maybe in conflict with 
community future prosperity or overall development agenda. For example, importation of palm 
oil into the economies of Eastern Africa would benefit consumers by ensuring access to cheap 
edible oils and fats. The refining industry owners would also reap profits.  However, this is all 
undertaken at the expense of the many potential oil crops producers who could benefit by 
producing and selling to the processing industry, leading to creation of employment and wealth 
that can sustain the purchasing power to the population. Given that the areas with potential for 
oil crops production in the region also have medium to low potential for production of other 
crops, lack of income opportunities from oil crops could drive those communities to engage in 




Sustainability of the importation of palm oil could also be questioned on the basis of lack of 
adequate foreign currency resources in most of the countries in the region. These imports can 
only be sustained at the expense of other more important income generating opportunities thus 
depressing economic growth. 
 
Equity 
The projects reviewed in this study suggest that multi-stakeholder negotiation is neither possible 
nor desirable for powerless groups. Weak, disenfranchised stakeholders stand to lose much from 
negotiations where power differences are too acute to enable collaboration. For instance, small- 
holder farmers and small-scale processors were found to be among the weak groups that were 
difficult to incorporate into the stakeholder forums and whose interests were easily ignored. To 
enable weak groups to participate effectively, there is need to empower them before they can 
engage in negotiations. Nevertheless, all stakeholders stand to benefit when the negotiation 
playing field is transparent, so that the decision to venture into a negotiation is based on reliable 
information.  
 
Stakeholder analysis can therefore be used as a stepping-stone toward agreements on 
collaborative management of natural resources (a sustainability issue). “Co-management” 
provides negotiated options to move forward in the context of conflicting interests, in an age of 
pluralism and new patterns of local governance. Collaborative management seeks to build on 
locally agreed-to approaches in an adaptive, progressive manner. One desirable outcome of 
collaboration is that it yields agreements on ways to move forward that emerge from interaction 
among stakeholders, rather than being imposed from outside (Engel 1997; Holling et al. 1998; 
Röling and Jiggins 1998). 
 
Stakeholder analysis tools are commonly used within most collaborative planning processes. In 
such instances, they are best described as a set of analytical tools embedded in collaborative or 
negotiation methods. On the other hand, stakeholder analysis moves to centre stage as a method 
when it is used to plan an intervention or to understand and analyze a complex situation 
(Burgoyne 1994; Grimble et al. 1995; ODA 1995; Grimble and Wellard 1996) In such cases, it is 
common to find stakeholder analysis combined with other planning and appraisal methods that 
are based on systems thinking and that seek to embrace complexity and the interrelated parts, 
such as collaborative learning (Daniels and Walker 1997), RAAKS (Engel and Salomon 1997), 
collaborative management (Borrini-Feyerabend 1996), and PRA (Ramírez 1997). 
 
Issues of gender equity should also be considered in program design, research, and development.  
This can be achieved through wider consultations and background information on potential 
gender effects of any research or development program.  Failure to address gender issues can 
lead to gender lobbyists challenging the project.  In addition, those feeling disfranchised among 
the gender divide are likely to oppose the program and hence lead to its failure and lack of 
sustainability. Gender analysis would also inform, PCS practitioners of any need to focus their 
research agenda on particular groups of the gender divide.  For example, if in a particular 
community cassava production is a preserve of women and children, it is important for 
researchers to make this discovery early enough so that they can research for technologies that 
are best suited for women and children.  Gender equity is therefore a critical consideration in 





The PCS theory underpins the need to apply resources efficiently by avoiding duplication, which 
can result from poor stakeholder consultations and lack of prior understanding of a commodity 
sector.  The idea of an incremental approach in which future research design is based on past 
analytical information ensures that resources are applied only to areas that are deemed to be a 
priority.  Stakeholders can play an important role in research agenda prioritization.  The FSR and 
stakeholder analysis can contribute greatly to understanding a commodity system and the 
underlying concerns and expectations of the relevant stakeholders, and lead to an efficient 
application of resources.  Market analysis and value chain analyses, provide the understanding of 
the consumer demand, taste, while at the same time unlocking the inefficiencies, which may 
affect commodity development.  The combination of these tools is critical in ensuring efficiency 
in production, transformation and final utilization of a commodity.  For example lack of 
understanding of consumer needs, may lead to research in varieties or commodities that may not 
have much demand in the market place; taste and colour could a major consideration in 
consumer demand for cassava, while a biological research may be driven by the desire to breed 
for disease resistance, higher yielding, early maturing varieties, which may not necessarily be of 
any consumer use.  Efficiency here could mean applying resources in a way that maximises 
consumer benefits. 
 
Greater economic growth and benefits to the wider community/constituency of stakeholders can 
be achieved through prior stakeholder analysis, which improves the chances of adoption and /or 
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Table 1: Analytical Matrix of IDRC Oil Crops and PCSA-related Projects  






Rationale for inclusion of 
stakeholders 
(Why) 
Concerns of Stakeholders  Lessons learnd
Oilseeds 
Network 
















Yield improvement, disease 
and pest resistance,
adaptability to different AEZs 
and knowledge generation. 
 
Project outputs restricted to 
development of new varieties. 
Researchers not sure of development 
effects of new varieties. 
 
Research design did not have a 
mechanism for measuring impact on 
intended beneficiaries.  
 
No input from other stakeholders. 
VOPS(K) 
 
1988-1996 State universities, MoA, 
MoI, MOLD, MPND, 
processors, seed company, 
research institutes, farmers,  
 





of above including farmer 
representatives),  





Identified constraints were 
crosscutting that needed 










Private sector desired 
immediate results and felt 
that cost of local production 
was too high relative to 
imports. 
 
Lack of clear crop policy. 
 
Some stakeholders held 
other in contempt. 
 
Key government departments 
were not engaged in the 
stakeholder group which 
reduced effectiveness in 
influencing policy. 
Stakeholders need to find benefits 
from engaging in process, otherwise 
they leave. 
 
The champion/convenrr must 
demonstrate neutrality and command 
respect of stakeholders. 
 
Champion should anticipate the 
dynamics of the subsector and 
respond appropriately. 
 
Different institutions have taken up 
elements of the PCSA and there is 
greater awareness of the need for 
stakeholder involvement. 
ORCESA  1992-1994 Covered Tanzania and 
Zambia 
MoA, processors, research 
institutes, feed millers, 
NGOs, farmer associations,  
regional trading To identify crosscutting 
Complement multi-
disciplinary and multi-
institutional collaboration in 
research and policy change.  
 
Private sector desired 
immediate results and felt 
that cost of local production 
was too high relative to 
imports. 
 
There was obvious suspicion between 
supposedly competing stakeholders 
and this led to withholding of 










Rationale for inclusion of 
stakeholders 
(Why) 
Concerns of Stakeholders Lessons learnd 
organization,  VOPS(K) 
 





of above including farmer 
representatives),  






Share knowledge and 
information about the 
subsector. 
 
To achieve broadbased 




Facilitation of germplasm 
exchange of high oil yielding 
soft-shelled sunflower seed. 
 
Researchers from the two 
countries were trained in 
PCSR approaches at 
Egerton University. 
issues that needed
interventions from multiple 
stakeholders. 
 Private sector was concerned 
about the lack of policy 




The effort would turn out to 
be another endless round of 
research without tangible 
benefits to the private sector. 
 
To form a credible lobby 
group capable of influencing 
government policy and to 
chart out development 




Cheap and sometimes 
contraband imports through 
neighbouring countries. 
 
There were high expectations for 
immediate solutions to existing 
problems. 
VOPSIN 1994-1997 Covered Uganda, Malawi, 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania and 
Zambia. 
Processors, seed
companies, NGOs, Ministry 
of Trade and Industry, 
Agriculture, Research





institutional collaboration in 
research and policy change.  
 Identified constraints were 
crosscutting that needed 
interventions from multiple 
stakeholders.  
The method of engagement 




To achieve broadbased 
 
Private sector desired 
immediate results and felt 
that cost of local production 
was too high relative to 
imports. 
 
Farmers considered these 
forums as opportunities to 




Resources and time available for the 
exercise were inadequate to achieve 
the necessary cohesiveness among 
the stakeholders. 
 
Effective champion needs to be 
backed with thorough understanding 
of the subsector along with the needs 
and interests of the stakeholders. 
 
Political/policy goodwill from 
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Rationale for inclusion of 
stakeholders 
(Why) 
Concerns of Stakeholders Lessons learnd 
council, workshops, visits, 
steering committees,
surveys and information 
sharing.  
 







Processors wanted an 
opportunity to influence 
government policy on imports 
of raw materials. 
 
To form a credible lobby 
group capable of influencing 
government policy and to 
chart out development 
programs for subsector. 
 
 
Farmers, processors, and 
ministries saw this as an 
opportunity to get COMESA 
to help in getting fair trading 
practices with member states. 
 
Market rivalries tended to spill 
over into the forums. 
government is critical to achieve an 
effective championship group by 
conferring credibility to the group.  
 
Lack of government vision for the sub-
sector undermining opportunity for 
coherent and coordinated efforts. 
 
There is need for a committed, 
knowledgeable and respected 





Table 2: Analytical Matrix Contrasting PCSA and Other Systems Analysis Models 
System    Concepts Intention Effects
Production to Consumption Systems 
Approach (PCSA) 
Emphasis on key human decision 
making groups. 
 
Visualizes structure, behaviour, and 




Uses stepwise incremental approach 
to build the necessary knowledge 
about the sector. 
 
Promotes the establishment of a 
sustainable human organization.  
Identify and capture opportunities to 
improve sectoral performance. 
 
Identify key intervention points and 
interest groups, their expectations, 
concerns, and organization. 
 




To update information on the sector, as 
well as maintain cost-effective research 
and related interventions. 
Their potential contribution to 










Individual or teams of researchers 
would be able to draw freely from 
such sector knowledge and human 
base to improve their ability to design, 
obtain support for and deliver results 
from their research efforts. 
Farming Systems Research and 
Extension 
Incorporates interaction of a 
commodity system with other farm 
enterprises. 
 
Centres on the farm’s decision-making 
process but does not consider 
consumer and market factors or the 
policy environment facing the 
commodity. 
 
PCSA permits a glimpse into the 
environment surrounding the FS with 
which it intersects and along the 
transects formed by the people and 
the processes involved after the on-
Understand labour and other farm 
resource allocation decisions. 
 
 
To improve technological uptake by 
the farmers based on resource 
availability. 
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System Concepts Intention Effects 
farm production stage. 
 
PCSA also provides information that 
is useful to FS practioners to 
understand how farmers make 
decisions about what to farm, when 
and why. 
Sector Analysis Looks at different channels through 
which a commodity flows, from 
production to consumption (vertical 
links between different players in a 
commodity). 
 
Describes key elements of the 
subsector and diagnoses key 
constraints to better performance. 
 To indicate policies and projects to 
overcome the identified constraints. 
Market Research To determine supply and demand 
conditions for a commodity and the 
price levels at a given time. 
 
To determine the process of price 
determination, market size, players, 
type of market (competitive, 
monopoly, etc). 
To make investment decisions, policy 
decisions, measure competitiveness of 
the market. 
To improve the quality of investment, 
policy, and marketing decisions. 
Stakeholder Analysis To identify stakeholders. 
As a management tool in policy-
making.  
It is an assessment of stakeholder 
interests and ways in which those 
interests affect project risk and 
viability. 
Empirically to discover existing patterns of 
interaction.  
 
Analytically improve interventions.  
 
To learn about and learn from 
stakeholders. 
 
To predict conflict.  
It is a precursor and a preparation for full 
stakeholder participation in the project life. 





To make strategic participation and 
project development decisions on the 
basis of that knowledge. 
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System Concepts Intention Effects 
 
Commodity Chain Looks at transformation of a 
commodity from production to final 
utilization. 
Understand how the commodity changes 
along the chain and in this way identify 
opportunities and constraints along the 
commodity chain. 
To make investment and/or 
intervention decisions. 
 
Value Chain Looks at the steps of commodity 
transformation, aggregation,
disaggregation, and distribution. 
 
Understand how the commodity changes 
along the chain and in this way identify 
opportunities and constraints along the 
commodity chain. 
To make investment decisions. 
 
To identify interventions that could 
transform the commodity performance 




Table 3: Contrast between PCSA and Other Approaches. 
 FSR Sector Analysis Stakeholder Analysis Market Research Commodity Chain Value Chain 
PCSA PCSA permits a glimpse  
into the environment 
surrounding the FS with 
which it intersects and along 
the transects formed by the 
people and the processes 
involved after the on-farm 
production stage. 
 
PCSA also provides 
information that is useful to 
FS practioners to
understand how farmers 
make decisions about what 
to farm, when, and why. 
  
The Sector Diagnostic 
Studies conducted under 
PCSA constitute large 
elements of sector 
analysis.  
 
Sector Analysis does not 
concern itself with the 
interactions between
stakeholders along the 
commodity chain. 
  
Sector Analysis does not 
consider the incremental 
approach which is central 
to PCSA. 
 
Sector Analysis does not 
recognize the role of a 
champion to push the 
agenda identified in the 
analysis unlike PCSA 




Stakeholder Analysis has 
refined the tools for 
stakeholder identification. It 
does not classify them, unlike 
PCSA which categorized 
stakeholders into three 
categories: primary,
secondary, and key players. 
 
All elements of market 
research are used in 
PCSA. However, market 
research does not 
emphasize stakeholder 
analysis or participation.  
It is a one-time snapshot 






Commodity Chain is a 
subset of the PCSA 
and does not entail 
stakeholder 
involvement. It is a 
one-time snapshot of 






involved in driving the 
process whereas the  
 
 
In the PCSA, 
stakeholders are 
involved in driving 
the process 
whereas  the  Commodity Chain is 
researcher driven. 
Value Chain is a 
subset of the PCSA 
and does not entail 
stakeholder 
involvement. It is a 
one-time snapshot 




Value Chain is 
researcher driven. 
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